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INTRODUCTION
In marking the beginning of Justice John Paul Stevens's fourth decade on
the Supreme  Court of the United  States, one  could not in good conscience
omit discussion of his philosophy of statutory interpretation.  For some time
now,  Justice  Stevens  has  been the  Court's  most  vocal  and,  I believe, the
ablest defender  of what two  generations  of judges and  lawyers  took to  be
the  post-New  Deal  consensus  on  statutory  interpretation:  the  idea  that
legislation  is  a  purposive  act,  and  that  judges  should  interpret  acts  of
Congress  to  implement  the  legislative  purpose,  even if doing so  requires
some deviation from the semantic detail of the enacted text.1  The basis for
his  position-which,  until  recently,  was  also  the  Court's 2-is  familiar.
Justice  Stevens  starts  from the  faithful  agent  theory;  he  believes  that the
federal  courts  in  our  system  must  discern  and  apply  Congress's  intended
meaning  as  accurately  as  possible.3  He also  falls within  a deeply  rooted
intellectual  tradition  that  emphasizes  the  fallibility  of  legislative
* Professor of Law,  Harvard Law  School.  I thank David Barron,  Bradford  Clark,  Daniel
Farber, Philip Frickey, Debra Livingston, and Henry Monaghan  for insightful suggestions.  I
am grateful to the participants  of the Fordham  Law School conference on the Jurisprudence
of Justice Stevens for thoughtful and stimulating comments on the paper.
1.  In  United States v.  American Trucking Ass'ns, 310  U.S.  534,  543-44  (1940),  the
Court offered  a highly influential description of that practice:
When  [plain]  meaning has led to absurd or futile results...  this Court has  looked
beyond the words to the purpose of the act.  Frequently,  however, even when the
plain  meaning  did not  produce  absurd  results  but  merely  an  unreasonable  one
"plainly  at variance  with  the policy  of the  legislation as  a whole"  this  Court has
followed  that purpose, rather  than the  literal words.  When  aid to construction  of
the meaning of words, as used in the  statute, is available,  there certainly can be no
"rule  of law"  which  forbids  its  use,  however  clear  the  words  may  appear  on
"superficial  examination."
2.  See  infra note  87  (citing  cases  establishing  the  orthodoxy  prior to  the Rehnquist
Court);  see also infra text  accompanying  notes  109-16  (discussing  the  shift  in prevailing
interpretive norms during the Rehnquist Court).
3.  See  United  States  v. Wells,  519  U.S.  482,  510-11  (1997)  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)
("Even  the  Court's  recent  jurisprudence  affirms  that  '[t]he  purpose  of  Congress  is  the
ultimate  touchstone."'  (quoting Gade v. Nat'l  Solid Wastes  Mgmt.  Ass'n, 505  U.S.  88,  96
(1992)));  Griffin  v.  Oceanic  Contractors,  Inc.,  458  U.S.  564,  577  (1982)  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting)  ("In  final  analysis,  any  question  of statutory construction  requires  the judge to
decide how the legislature intended its enactment to apply to the case at hand.").
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expression. 4   Limits  on  human  foresight,  imprecision  in  the  tools  of
linguistic  expression,  and  constraints  on legislative  resources  contribute  to
the production  of generally worded  texts that could not possibly capture  the
variety of situations that lie ahead.  If a statute's semantic detail produces an
outcome that appears unreasonable  in light of the law's background purpose
(often,  as  reflected  in the  legislative  history), Justice  Stevens  assumes that
Congress spoke clearly but inaccurately in choosing the words to express its
aims.  In other words, he presumes that Congress  is (understandably)  error
prone in  linguistic expression but quite coherent  in the substantive  framing
of policies  that  serve  some  overarching  purpose.  For  Justice  Stevens,
respect for Congress means fidelity to that purpose rather than to the often-
faulty semantic details of whatever text it happened to adopt.
In the past two decades,  Justice Stevens has fought what is largely a rear-
guard  action  in  defense  of post-war purposivism.  In  matters  of statutory
interpretation,  the  story  of the  Rehnquist  Court  was,  if anything,  one  of
movement  toward  textualism-a  philosophy  that  gives  precedence  to  a
statute's  semantic meaning, when  clear, and eschews reliance on legislative
history  or  other  indicia  of background  purpose  to  vary  the  conventional
meaning of the text.5  Justice Antonin Scalia, whose appointment coincided
with  the  advent  of  the  Rehnquist  Court,  has  been  the  most  influential
exponent of the Court's new (or, he would argue, renewed) emphasis  on the
conventional  semantic  import  of the  text.  The  design  of the  legislative
process  emphasizes  the need  for compromise,  and compromises  are often
complex,  awkward,  and  even  incoherent-thus  making  it  dangerous  for
judges to smooth  over the  details  of an  agreed-upon  text to make  it more
coherent  with  its  perceived  purpose.  On  that  view,  judges  should  hew
closely to the semantic import of what Congress  as a whole has been able to
agree upon through the opaque and path-dependent processes for adopting a
statutory  text;  they  should  not  try  to  improve  upon  the  end  product  by
superimposing  an  almost  surely  counterfactual  presumption  of reasonable
coherence  with  some  hypothesized  background  purpose.  Justice  Scalia's
vision  of Congress  thus  presumes  that  it  is  quite  deliberate  in  statutory
expression, but  (understandably)  quite  messy  in the substantive  policies  it
adopts.  For him, respect for Congress means accepting the semantic  import
(when  clear)  of whatever  text  in  fact  surmounted  the  high  hurdles  of a
legislative  process  designed to make  it hard  to  adopt statutes and  easy for
legislative gatekeepers  to insist upon compromise as the price of assent.
This  Essay will  compare these rival presumptions,  trying to  cast each in
its  most  sympathetic  light,  and  then  will  suggest  why  the  textualists'
presumption  of untidy  compromise  fits more  comfortably  with legislative
process assumptions  derived from the  constitutional  structure.  In Part  I, I
elaborate on the premises about legislation that Justice Stevens brings to the
4.  The discussion that follows builds upon John F. Manning,  Textualism and  the Equity
of  the Statute, 101  Colum. L. Rev.  1, 10-15  (2001).
5.  See infra text accompanying  notes 109-16.
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practice  of purposivism.  In  particular,  I note  that Justice  Stevens  equates
respect for the legislative process with the presumption that  legislatures  act
reasonably.  For him,  sharp  textual  deviations  from  reasonable  coherence
presumably  reflect  legislative  misstatement  rather  than  design.  Part  II
examines  Justice  Scalia's  competing  premise  that  the  legislative  process
often entails messy and untraceable  compromise.  For him, respect  for that
process  entails the  assumption that oddities  in textual outcome  reflect  such
compromise.  In both parts I supplement the Justices'  writing with the often
more elaborate analyses of the legislative process written by their respective
intellectual  allies  on  the  United  States  Court  of Appeals  for the  Seventh
Circuit-Judge  Richard  Posner in  the  case  of Justice  Stevens,  and  Judge
Frank Easterbrook in Justice Scalia's case.
In  Part  III,  I  disclose  my  own  (scarcely  concealed)  sympathies  for
textualism.  In particular,  I explain that given the complexity and opacity of
the  legislative  process,  neither  Justice  Stevens  nor  Justice  Scalia  has
empirical  basis  for  concluding  in  any  given  case  that  awkwardness  in  a
statute's  means/ends  fit is  reliably  traceable  to  either  mistaken  legislative
expression  or unrecorded  compromise.  Accordingly,  equating  respect  for
Congress  with  one  presumption  or  the  other  ultimately  must  depend  on
identifying  some  systemic,  normatively  rooted  premise  that  ultimately
derives  from  the  constitutional  structure.  Building  on  earlier  writing,  I
argue  in  Part  III.A  that  the presumption  of deliberate  drafting but untidy
compromise  is  more  respectful  of the  central  place  of compromise  in  the
constitutional  design  of  the  legislative  process.6   In  particular  such  a
presumption  enables  legislators  to  rely  on  semantic  detail  to  express  the
level of generality  at which  a  proposed  legislative  policy  is acceptable  to
them.  If the  Court  presumes  that  awkward  statutory  outcomes  typically
reflect  mistaken  expression,  then  legislators  cannot  reliably  use  the  only
effective  tool at  their disposal-the  phrasing  of a  statutory command-to
express  limits  upon  the  legislative  policy  to  which  they  are  willing  to
assent.  Part  III.B,  in  turn,  argues  that  a  background  interpretive
presumption of messy  legislative  compromise  rather  than  drafting error  is
more  consistent with  the  legislative  and judicial process  assumptions  that
underlie  the  modern  rational-basis  test,  which defines  the  default position
under the  Due Process  and Equal Protection Clauses for judicial review of
ordinary  social  and  economic  legislation  (viz.  legislation  that  does  not
implicate  suspect  classifications  or  fundamental  rights).  The  Court  has
repeatedly  admonished  that  judges  in  our  system  of  government  must
uphold  legislation  that  has  any  conceivable  rational  basis,  lest  they
substitute  their own  conception  of wise and coherent  legislative policy  for
the untidy  results of the democratic  process.  An  assertion  of authority  to
displace  insufficiently  coherent  statutory  classifications  in  the  name  of
purposive interpretation authorizes judges to do indirectly what the rational-
basis  cases  forbid  them  to do  directly.  For  these  reasons,  even  though it
6.  See infra Part III.A.
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may  be  realistically  impossible  to know  in any  case  whether  an  awkward
statutory  application  reflects  legislative  error  (as  Justice  Stevens  would
have  it) or compromise  (as  Justice  Scalia  might claim),  salient  features  of
our constitutional  structure suggest that judges should apply  a presumption
of messy compromise  rather than scrivener's error.
I.  JUSTICE STEVENS  AND THE PRESUMPTION  OF COHERENT POLICY
MAKING  BUT MESSY  DRAFTING
Justice  Stevens has  long held the  view that interpreters  should presume
that  Congress  pursues  relatively  coherent  policy  objectives  but  often
expresses those policies imprecisely.  In that sense, he writes in the tradition
of  Church of the  Holy  Trinity v.  United States,7  which  stands  for  the
familiar principle that the text of a statute, however clear,  must yield to  its
purpose when the  latter is clear.8  The  facts  are familiar to those who have
followed  the  statutory  interpretation  debate  in recent  years.  The  Contract
Labor Act had made it a crime to assist or encourage any alien to migrate to
the United States to "'perform  labor or service of any kind.' 9  The church
had contracted with a cleric,  E. Walpole  Warren, to  move from England to
minister  to  a New  York  congregation,  and  the  Court  acknowledged  that
doing  so transgressed  the  express  terms of the Act's textual  prohibition.' 0
The  Court,  however,  held  that  "a  thing  may  be  within  the  letter  of the
statute  and  yet  not within  the  statute,  because  not  within  its  spirit,  nor
within the intention of its makers."' 1  In particular, the Court found that the
statute's  background  purpose  was  to  prevent  the  migration  of  manual
laborers  rather  than "brain  toilers"  like Reverend  Warren.  The Act's  title
only  mentioned  those  who  came  "to  perform  labor,"12   and  the
circumstances  surrounding  the  Act's  passage,  including  the  legislative
history,  further  suggested that Congress  sought only  to prevent "the  influx
7.  143 U.S. 457 (1892).
8.  Indeed, in more than a decade and a half, only opinions written by Justice John Paul
Stevens have  cited Holy Trinity affirmatively  for the crucial  interpretive  principle that it has
come  to  represent.  See Dodd  v.  United  States,  125  S.  Ct. 2478,  2488  (2005)  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting);  Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 476 (1991)  (Stevens, J.,  dissenting).
9.  Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458 (quoting  23  Stat. 332 (1885)).
10.  The Holy Trinity Court acknowledged  that the church's  action had violated  the letter
of the law. See id.  at 458-59.  In Holy Trinity, the Court wrote as follows:
It must be conceded  that the act of the corporation  is within the letter of this sec-
tion, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service,  and implies labor on
the  one side with  compensation on the other.  Not only are the general words "la-
bor" and "service"  both  used, but also,  as it were  to guard against any  narrow in-
terpretation  and emphasize  a breadth of meaning,  to them is added "of any kind;"
and, further..  . the fifth section  [of the statute], which makes  specific exceptions,
among  them professional  actors,  artists,  lecturers, singers, and  domestic  servants,
strengthens  the  idea that every other kind of labor and service  was  intended to be
reached.
Id.
11.  Id. at 459.
12.  Id. at 463.
2012 [Vol.  74COMPETING PRESUMPTIONS
of...  cheap unskilled  labor."'13  And, of course, the Court famously  noted
that  given  the  commonly  held  and  deeply  rooted religious  values  of  the
populace, judges  should not assume that the nation's representatives  would
have  intended to prohibit the immigration of clergy had the question arisen
expressly  during  the  legislature's  deliberations. 14  Based  on  all  of those
contextual  circumstances,  the Court  found  it "unreasonable  to believe  that
the  legislat[ure]  intended to  include  the particular act"  of hiring a minister
from  abroad. 15   Instead,  the  Court  concluded  that  the  enacted  text
"unexpectedly  ...  reach[ed]  cases  and acts which...  could not have been
intentionally  legislated  against."'16  So  bringing  the  text  into  line  with  its
purpose  was  not "the  substitution  of the  will  of the judge  for  that of the
legislator,"' 17  but  rather  a  superior  way  to  fulfill  the  Court's  duty  as  a
faithful congressional agent.
Justice  Stevens  subscribes  to this approach.  He  believes  that  a faithful
agent must follow  his or her principal's purpose rather than phraseology in
13.  Id. at 465.  The  Court laid particular emphasis on a Senate  Report, which explained
as follows:
The  general  facts and  considerations  which  induce the  committee  to  recommend
the passage of this bill are set forth  in the  Report of the Committee of the House.
The committee report the bill back without amendment,  although there are certain
features thereof which might well be changed or modified, in the hope that the bill
may  not  fail  of  passage  during  the  present  session.  Especially  would  the
committee  have  otherwise  recommended  amendments,  substituting  for  the
expression  "labor  and  service,"  whenever  it  occurs  in  the  body of the  bill,  the
words "manual  labor" or "manual service,"  as sufficiently broad to accomplish  the
purposes of the bill, and that such  amendments would remove objections which a
sharp and perhaps unfriendly  criticism may urge to the proposed legislation.  The
committee, however, believing that the bill in its present form will be construed  as
including only those  whose labor or service  is manual  in character, and being very
desirous that the bill become  a law before the adjournment,  have reported the  bill
without change.
Id. at 464-65 (citation  omitted).  For an excellent  analysis suggesting that the  Court misread
this legislative  history  see  Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The  Untold Story of Holy  Trinity  Church,  50  Stan.  L.  Rev.  1833,  1845-50
(1998).
14.  The Court explained as follows:
Suppose  in the  Congress that passed  this act  some member  had  offered  a bill
which in terms declared that, if any Roman Catholic church in this country  should
contract  with Cardinal  Manning  to come to this country and  enter into its service
as pastor and priest; or any Episcopal church should enter  into a like contract with
Canon Farrar;  or any Baptist church  should make similar arrangements  with Rev.
Mr. Spurgeon;  or any Jewish  synagogue  with some eminent  Rabbi,  such contract
should be  adjudged  unlawful  and  void,  and the  church  making  it  be  subject  to
prosecution  and  punishment,  can  it  be  believed  that  it  would  have  received  a
minute of approving thought or a single vote?  Yet it is contended  that such was  in
effect the meaning of this statute.  The construction  invoked cannot be accepted as
correct.
Holy Trinity, 143 U.S.  at 472; see also id. at 465  ("[N]o purpose  of action against  religion
can be imputed to any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people.").
15.  Id. at 459.
16.  Id  at 472.
17.  Id. at 459.
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cases in which  the conventional meaning  of a text makes little sense of the
purposes  that  apparently  inspired  it. 18  There  is  much  to be  said  for  this
position.  It is undeniable  that all laws are over-inclusive or under-inclusive
relative  to  their  background  justifications.  Indeed,  the  more  precisely
drafted  the  law,  the more  likely  it  is  to  reflect such problems  of fit.19  As
Justice Stevens has thus acknowledged, the superficial  semantic  clarity of a
text may be  "'the consequence  of a  legislative accident,  perhaps caused by
nothing more than the unfortunate  fact that Congress is too busy to do all of
its  work  as  carefully  as  it  should."' 20  Or,  put  another  way,  "legislative
oversight or inadvertence  can at times produce  statutory language  that does
not cleanly reflect Congress'  intention. '21
This  emphasis  on the possibility of legislative  inadvertence  puts Justice
Stevens in good company.  Thinkers no less consequential than Aristotle,22
Blackstone,23  and  Madison 24  all  recognized  the  inherent  difficulties  of
accurate  legislative  expression.  And  an  important  strand  of  modem
18.  See infra Parts I.A-C.
19.  See,  e.g.,  Colin  S.  Diver,  The  Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules,  93  Yale
L.J.  65,  73 (1983)  ("Increasing  the transparency of a rule may increase  the variance between
intended  and actual outcomes.  The rulemaker may be  unable to predict  every consequence
of applying  the  rule  or to  foresee  all  the  circumstances  to  which  it  may apply.");  Louis
Kaplow,  Rules  Versus Standards: An  Economic Analysis, 42  Duke  L.J.  557,  591  (1992)
("[T]he  simple  rule  is  both  over-  and  underinclusive  compared  to  the  more  complex
standard.").
20.  United  States  v.  Locke,  471  U.S.  84,  118-19  (1985)  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)
(emphasis  omitted)  (quoting  Del. Tribal  Bus.  Comm.  v.  Weeks,  430  U.S.  73,  97  (1977)
(Stevens, J.,  dissenting)).
21.  Pittston  Coal  Group  v.  Sebben,  488  U.S.  105,  145  n.10  (1988)  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting).
22.  Aristotle wrote as follows:
When  the law  speaks universally...  and a case arises  on it which  is not covered
by the  universal  statement,  then  it is  right, where  the  legislator  fails us  and  has
erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission-to  say what the legislator himself
would have  said had he been  present,  and would  have put into his law  if he had
known.
Aristotle, V Nichomachean Ethics 10:19-24 (W.D. Ross trans.,  1925).
23.  Blackstone explained:
[S]ince in laws all cases cannot be foreseen  or expressed, it is necessary, that when
the general  decrees of the law come  to be  applied to particular cases,  there should
be  somewhere  a  power  vested of defining  those circumstances,  which  (had they
been foreseen)  the legislator himself would have expressed.
William Blackstone,  1 Commentaries *62.
24.  See  The  Federalist  No.  37,  at  225  (James  Madison)  (Clinton  Rossiter  ed.,  1961).
Madison thus emphasized:
All new laws,  though penned  with the  greatest  technical  skill and passed on  the
fullest and  most mature deliberation,  are considered  as  more or less  obscure  and
equivocal,  until  their  meaning  be  liquidated  and  ascertained  by  a  series  of
particular  discussions  and  adjudications.  Besides  the  obscurity  arising  from the
complexity  of objects  and  the  imperfection  of the  human  faculties,  the  medium
through which  the  conceptions  of men  are conveyed to  each  other adds  a  fresh
embarrassment.
Id.  In contrast with Aristotle and  Blackstone, Madison  acknowledged  the difficulty but did
not urge interpretation in contravention of the clear semantic  import of the text.
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language theory, known as pragmatics,  rests on the compatible  premise that
because  human beings sometimes express themselves  inaccurately, listeners
in a cooperative  setting must occasionally  tweak the literal meaning of what
has been said in order to make sense of an utterance  in context.25
In modem times, no one has encapsulated  the common  sense of this idea
more  clearly than Judge  Posner, whose interpretive  philosophy aligns  quite
closely with  that of Justice  Stevens.26  Posner  has  written  that it  is  only
natural  for judges  to  adjust  the  semantic  import  of a statutory  text  when
there  is  a  mismatch  between  its  conventional  meaning  and  the  statute's
background  aims:
[J]udges realize  in their heart of hearts that the superficial clarity to which
they  are  referring  when  they  call  the  meaning  of a  statute  "plain"  is
treacherous  footing  for  interpretation.  They  know  that  statutes  are
purposive  utterances and that language  is a slippery medium  in which to
encode  a purpose.  They know that legislatures, including the Congress of
25.  Language  philosopher  Paul  Grice  thus  argues  that  conversations  are  typically
cooperative  enterprises  and  that  the  norms  of  communication  should  follow  from  that
premise. See Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words 26 (1989).  Grice then deduces  several
maxims  to  implement  this  "Cooperative  Principle."  Id.  These  commonsense  norms  of
conversation  include  the following:  "Make your contribution  as informative  as is required"
(quantity);  "[t]ry  to  make  your  contribution  one  that  is  true"  (quality);  "[b]e  relevant"
(relation); and "[a]void  obscurity of expression"  (manner). Id. at  26-27.  Grice believes that
if a speaker  apparently  flouts  the  cooperative principle,  a listener  may sometimes  properly
assign  an  unconventional  meaning  to  the  utterance,  interpreting  it  as  if the  cooperative
principle had been observed. Id. at 30-31.  Recent legal scholarship  has sought  to rely on the
cooperative  principle  to  justify  atextual,  purposive  interpretation  of the  type  practiced  by
Justice  Stevens. See, e.g.,  Geoffrey  P. Miller, Pragmatics  and the Maxims of  Interpretation,
1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1179,  1211  (arguing that if conventional  meaning of a statute disserves its
apparent  background  purpose,  then  interpreting  the  statute  as  written  would  violate  the
cooperative principle  by assuming  that "Congress  was either  deceptive  or lacked sufficient
evidence  for the presupposition"  that the command  served its goals);  M.B.W. Sinclair, Law
and Language: The Role of Pragmatics  in Statutory Interpretation,  46  U.  Pitt. L.  Rev. 373,
397-99 (1985)  (invoking  the maxim of quality to explain the strongly  purposive methods of
interpretation).
26.  Justice  Stevens  often  invokes  Judge  Posner  in  support  of  his  interpretive
conclusions.  See,  e.g.,  Chapman v.  United  States,  500  U.S.  453,  475  (1991)  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting)  ("'This  is  a  quilt  the  pattern  whereof  no  one  has  been  able  to  discern.  The
legislative history is silent, and since even the Justice Department  cannot explain the why of
the  punishment scheme  that  it  is defending,  the  most plausible  inference  is  that Congress
simply did not realize how LSD is sold."' (quoting United States v. Marshall,  908 F.2d  1312,
1333  (7th Cir.  1990)  (en banc)  (Posner, J.,  dissenting), rev'd sub norm., Chapman v.  United
States,  500  U.S.  453  (1991)));  Pittston Coal Group, 488  U.S.  at  145  n.10  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting)  ("'Interpretation  is  no  less  a valid  method  of acquiring  knowledge  because  it
necessarily  ranges  beyond the  text."'  (quoting Richard  A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation  of Statutes and the Constitution, 37  Case W. Res.  L. Rev.
179,  191  (1986)));  McNally  v.  United  States,  483  U.S.  350,  373  (1987)  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting)  (rejecting as "untenable"  the contention  "'that the meaning  of fraud in the mail-
fraud statute was frozen by the conception of fraud held by the framers of the statute  when it
was  first passed back  in the nineteenth century'  (quoting United  States v.  Holzer, 816  F.2d
304, 310 (7th Cir.  1987) (Posner., J.))).
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the  United  States,  often  legislate  in  haste, without  considering  fully the
potential application of their words to novel settings.27
Starting from  that assumption,  Judge  Posner  thinks  it only  common  sense
for  a  subordinate  to  implement  the  purpose  rather  than  the  semantic
meaning  of a superior's  command:  "Suppose  I ask my secretary  to call  Z
[to cancel  lunch].  The secretary notices  that on my calendar I have marked
lunch with Y, not Z ....  Is it not plain that the secretary should call Y, even
though  there was  no  semantic  or  internal  ambiguity  in my  instruction?" 28
By the same token, he writes:
When  a  court  can  figure  out what  Congress  probably was  driving  at
and how its goal can be achieved, it is not usurpation-it  is interpretation
in  a  sense  that  has  been  orthodox  since  Aristotle-for  the  court  to
complete (not enlarge)  the statute by reading it to bring about the end that
the  legislators  would  have  specified  had  they  thought  about  it  more
clearly or used a more perspicuous form of words.29
The  foregoing  passages  are  worth  quoting  here  precisely  because,  as  I
now attempt to demonstrate, they nicely capture  the jurisprudence of Justice
Stevens.  In  substantiating this  claim, my objective  is not to catalogue  the
countless interpretation decisions that Justice  Stevens has issued  in the past
three  decades.  Rather,  three famous opinions-all dissents and thus free of
the diluting effects of judicial compromise-exemplify  that philosophy  and
offer  a preliminary  basis to  evaluate  its merits and  demerits.  I ask for the
reader's  patience  here.  In  selecting  the  examples  that  follow,  I  have
focused  on cases that involve relatively technical questions, rather than "hot
button" issues with potentially distracting political or policy implications.
27.  Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511,  514 (7th Cir. 1989).
28.  Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence  268 (1990).  Along similar lines,
Professor Lon Fuller famously argued as follows:
No superior wants  a servant who lacks the capacity  to read between the lines.  The
stupidest  housemaid knows  that when  she is told  "to  peel the  soup and  skim the
potatoes" her mistress does not mean what she says.  She also knows that when her
master  tells  her to  "drop  everything  and  come  running"  he  has  overlooked  the
possibility that she is at the moment  in the act  of rescuing  the baby from the  rain
barrel.  Surely  we have  a right  to expect  the  same  modicum of intelligence  from
the judiciary.  The  correction of obvious legislative  errors  or oversights  is not to
supplant the legislative will, but to make  that will effective.
Lon L.  Fuller, The Case of  the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616,  625-26 (1949).
29.  Friedrich,  888  F.2d at 514.  For Judge Posner, a judge who  insists  on  enforcing a
textual  command  that  does  not  make  sense  of its  underlying  purpose  is no  better  than  a
soldier who, "having  received  an order that  is clear, but also clearly erroneous  because of a
mistake  in transmission,  nevertheless carries  out the order as  received, rather than trying to
determine  what response  would advance  the common enterprise."  Posner, supra note 26, at
205; see also Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation  and Legislative Supremacy, 78  Geo.
L.J. 281,  289 (1989)  ("[L]iteral application of a directive  might be senseless or contrary to its
obvious  purpose.  . . .Rejecting  the  literal  application  in  these  situations  can  hardly  be
considered disobedience.").
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A.  Mining Claims
In  United States  v.  Locke, 30  the  Court  considered  a  provision  of the
Federal  Land Policy  Management  Act of 1976  requiring holders of certain
mining  claims  to  record their  claims  "prior to December  31"  of each  year
following the year of initial recording. 31  The claimants  in Locke  had filed
on December 31,  and the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") found that
their claims had therefore  been abandoned as untimely.32  In sustaining the
agency's decision, the  Court reasoned  simply that the meaning  of "prior to
December  31"  was clear,  and  that "deadlines"  by nature  require  "a  literal
reading  of  Congress'  words"  because  they  are  intrinsically  arbitrary. 33
Further,  the  Court  added  that  "deference  to  the  supremacy  of  the
Legislature,  as well  as recognition that  Congressmen  typically vote  on the
language  of a  bill"  generally  compelled  it  to  assume  that  the  ordinary
meaning of the statutory text captured the legislative purpose. 34
Justice  Stevens  dissented.  In  particular,  looking  at  the  nature  of the
scheme, he emphasized  that it was obviously designed to require "periodic
filings  on a calendar-year  basis." 35  While  acknowledging  that  the text  of
the  statute  did not  "correctly  describe[]"  the  end of the  calendar year,  he
found it "understandable  that the author [of the statute]  might inadvertently
use the words  'prior to December  31'  when he meant to refer to the end of
the  calendar  year."36   Various  other  provisions  of the  statute  contained
anomalies  that could not be explained except as scrivener's errors,37 and an
earlier pamphlet issued by the BLM itself had (mis)read the statutory filing
deadline  in precisely  the way the claimants  had.38  Most important, Justice
Stevens  found  it "rather  clear" that the  statute's use of "prior to December
31 " "was  in  fact  an  error..,  because  no  one  has  suggested  any  rational
basis  for omitting just  one day  from the period  in which  an  annual  filing
may be made, and  I would not presume that Congress deliberately created a
trap for the unwary by such an omission."39  In other words, Justice Stevens
treated the mining claims  statute as a coherent but poorly expressed  end-of-
the-calendar-year  deadline  and  enforced  that  purpose  rather  than  the
(relatively clear) semantic  detail.
30.  471  U.S. 84 (1985).
31.  43 U.S.C.  § 1744(a) (1982).
32.  Locke, 471 U.S. at 90.
33.  Id. at 93.
34.  Id. at 95.
35.  Id. at  123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36.  Id.
37.  Among  them  was  the  following  anomaly  noted  by Judge  Posner  in  an  influential
article on statutory interpretation:
Further evidence  of inadvertence  in the use of "prior to" is that the same  section of
the  statute  distinguishes  between  claims  "located  prior to October  21,  1976"  and
claims  "located  after October 21,  1976,"  thus leaving  a void for claims  located on
October 21,  1976-if "prior to" is read literally.
Posner, supra  note 26, at 204.
38.  Locke, 471 U.S. at 120-22  (Stevens, J.,  dissenting).
39.  Id.  at  123.
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B.  Expert Fees
In  West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,40 the Court divided
over  the  meaning  of 42  U.S.C.  §  1988,  which  provides  that  prevailing
plaintiffs  in  certain  types  of civil  rights  actions  are  entitled  to  recover  "a
reasonable  attorney's fee as part of the costs."4 1  The plaintiff had sought to
recover  as part of his  § 1988  "attorney's  fees"  the fees  of experts  hired to
help  prepare  the  lawsuit  and to  testify  at trial.42  Although  the  Court had
previously  recognized  that the phrase "attorney's  fee"  constitutes  a term of
the  trade  that  includes  items  essential  to  legal  representation  (such  as
charges  for  paralegal  services,  secretarial  services,  messengers,
photocopying,  and  so  forth),43 the  Casey Court found specific  evidence  of
congressional  usage  that  foreclosed  treating  "expert  fees"  in  the  same
vein.44  In  particular,  countless  other  fee-shifting  statutes-some  enacted
before  and some after § 1988-had explicitly provided for "attorney's fees"
and  "expert  fees"  as  separate  items  of  recovery. 45  Under  the  maxim
expressio  unius  est  exclusio  alterius, "'it  is  generally  presumed  that
Congress  acts  intentionally  and  purposely  in  the  disparate  inclusion  or
exclusion"'  of particular  statutory  language.46  Accordingly,  the  Casey
Court found that the relevant "statutory  usage  shows beyond  question  that
attorney's fees and expert fees are distinct items of expense." 47
Justice  Stevens  dissented.  Although  acknowledging  that Congress  had
made  explicit  provision  for "attorney's  fees"  and  "expert  fees"  in  "many
other  statutes,"  the  question  for  him  was  "whether,  notwithstanding  the
omission of such  an  express  authorization  in  42 U.S.C.  § 1988,  Congress
intended to  authorize  such recovery." 48  For  several reasons,  he  concluded
that  Congress  had  so  intended.  First,  Justice  Stevens  reasoned  that  if a
40.  499  U.S.  83  (1991).
41.  42 U.S.C.  § 1988(b)  (1988).
42.  Casey, 499 U.S.  at 85.
43.  See  Missouri  v.  Jenkins, 491  U.S.  274,  285-86  (1989)  (holding that various  items
other  than  billable  attorney  hours,  including  paralegal  fees,  could  be  recovered  as
"traditional"  elements  of an  attorney's  fees).  The  Court  there  rested  on the  conventional
understanding  of the elements of an attorney's fee:
[T]he  fee  must  take  into  account  the  work  not only  of attorneys,  but  also  of
secretaries, messengers,  librarians, janitors, and others whose  labor contributes to
the  work  product  for  which  an  attorney  bills  her  client;  and  it  must  also  take
account  of other expenses  and profit.  The parties  have  suggested no  reason  why
the  work of paralegals  should  not be similarly compensated,  nor can  we  think  of
any.  We  thus  take  as  our  starting  point  the  self-evident  proposition  that  the
"reasonable  attorney's fee"  provided for by statute should compensate the work  of
paralegals,  as well as that of attorneys.
Id.  at 285.
44.  Casey, 499 U.S.  at 88.
45.  Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Casey relied  specifically on that disparity in
denying the recovery  of expert fees under § 1988. Id.  at 88-90.
46.  Russello v.  United  States, 464  U.S.  16,  23  (1983)  (quoting  United  States  v.  Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720,  722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
47.  Casey, 499  U.S.  at 92.
48.  Id. at  103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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prevailing plaintiff could recover a reasonable  "attorney's  fee,"  it made  no
sense  to  deny  the  plaintiff similar  recovery  for an  expert,  whose  services
merely  provided  a  lower  cost  substitute  for  attorney  time.49   Second,
because  the  Court  had  previously  recognized  that  a  prevailing  plaintiff
could recover other non-attorney  costs of legal representation under § 1988,
it would surely  be arbitrary to exclude the fees of experts used to make the
legal  representation  effective. 50  Third,  the  legislative  history  indicated-
and  the  sequence  of events,  in  any  case,  made  clear-that  Congress  had
enacted  §  1988  to  overturn  Alyeska  Pipeline Service  Co.  v.  Wilderness
Society,51  which  had  rejected  the  federal  courts'  earlier  common  law
practice of shifting litigation costs in certain federal cases.  Because the pre-
Alyeska regime  had shifted attorney's fees  and expert  fees, Justice  Stevens
thought it  fair to infer that  § 1988's  purpose was  to restore  the status  quo
ante. 52  Fourth,  and  most  generally,  "the  record  of House  and  Senate
subcommittee hearings, consisting of the testimony and written submissions
of public  officials,  scholars,  practicing  attorneys,  and private  citizens,  and
the  questions  of the  legislators,  [made]  clear  that both  committees  were
concerned  with  preserving  access  to  the  courts  and  encouraging  public
interest  litigation."53  For Justice Stevens,  denying expert  fees was  "at  war
with  the  [resultant]  congressional  purpose  of making  the prevailing  party
whole" for the costs of such litigation.54
In  closing,  Justice  Stevens  emphasized  that  "the  Court  has  vacillated
between  a purely  literal approach  to the task of statutory  interpretation and
an approach that seeks  guidance from historical context,  legislative history,
and prior cases identifying the purpose that motivated the legislation." 55  He
then  observed  that  in  cases  in  which  the  Court  "put  on  its  thick
grammarian's  spectacles  and  ignored  the  available  evidence  of
congressional purpose  and the teaching of prior cases construing a statute,"
Congress has been swift to revise the underlying statute to reject the Court's
interpretation.56  Starting from that premise, Justice  Stevens summed up his
basic philosophy of interpretation as follows:
In the  domain  of statutory  interpretation,  Congress  is  the  master.  It
obviously has the power to correct  our mistakes, but we do the country a
disservice  when  we  needlessly  ignore persuasive  evidence  of Congress'
actual purpose and require it "to take the time to revisit the matter" and to
restate  its  purpose  in  more  precise  English  whenever  its  work  product
49.  See id.  at  106-07.
50.  Id. at  107-08  ("To  allow reimbursement  of these  other categories  of expenses,  and
yet not to  include  expert witness  fees,  is both arbitrary  and contrary  to the broad remedial
purpose that inspired the fee-shifting provision of §  1988.").
51.  421 U.S.  240 (1975).
52.  See Casey, 499 U.S. at  108-11  (Stevens, J.,  dissenting).
53.  Id.  at 110.
54.  Id. at  111.
55.  Id. at  112.
56.  Id. at  113.
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suffers  from  an omission  or  inadvertent  error. As  Judge  Learned  Hand
explained,  statutes are likely to be imprecise.
"All  [legislators]  have  done is to write down certain words which they
mean to apply generally to situations of that kind. To apply these literally
may  either  pervert  what  was  plainly  their  general  meaning,  or  leave
undisposed of what there is every reason to suppose they meant to provide
for. Thus  it is  not  enough  for the judge just  to  use  a  dictionary.  If he
should do no more, he might come out with a result which every sensible
man would recognize to be quite the opposite of what was really intended;
which would contradict or leave unfulfilled its plain purpose." 57
In short,  for Justice  Stevens as for Judge Learned  Hand, Congress  is error-
prone  in  its  expression,  and judges  should  presume  that  such  error  has
occurred  when the text and the background  purpose  do not fit comfortably
together.
C.  Coal Miners
In  Barnhart v.  Sigmon  Coal  Co.,58  the  Court  enforced  the  clear  but
somewhat anomalous  semantic  import  of the Coal  Industry  Retiree  Health
Benefit  Act  of 1992  (the  "Coal  Act"),59  a  statute  enacted  to  address  the
potential insolvency  of coal industry retirement plans imposed by a series of
collective  bargaining  agreements  over many  years. 60  To  ensure  that  the
plans  would  be  adequately  funded,  the  Coal  Act  imposed  contributions
requirements  on  two  classes  of  businesses.  First,  it  imposed  such
obligations upon "signatory  operators"-coal operators who had signed  any
of the  previous  pension  agreements. 61  Second,  it required  contributions
from "related  persons"-companies  that  had  enjoyed  statutorily  specified
forms of business  affiliation with  signatory  operators.62  In Barnhart,  the
Commissioner  of Social  Security  had  imposed liability  on  the respondent
coal  company, which was neither a signatory operator nor a related person
but was a successor  in interest  to a signatory  operator (by  virtue of having
57.  Id.  at 115  (footnote  omitted)  (quoting Learned  Hand, How Far  Is a Judge Free in
Rendering a Decision?,  in The Spirit of Liberty  103,  106 (I. Dilliard ed.,  1952)).
58.  534  U.S. 438 (2002).
59.  26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (2000).
60.  See Barnhart,  534 U.S. at 442-45.
61.  26 U.S.C. § 9701(c)(1).
62.  Id. § 9701(c)(2).  In particular, the statute provides that "a person shall be considered
to  be  a related  person  to a  signatory  operator  if that person"  falls  within  one of following
categories:
(i)  a member  of the  controlled  group  of corporations  (within  the  meaning  of
section  52(a)) which includes such signatory operator;
(ii)  a  trade  or business  which  is  under common  control  (as  determined under
section  52(b)) with such signatory operator;  or
(iii)  any other person who  is identified as having a partnership  interest or joint
venture with a signatory operator in a business within the coal industry, but only if
such  business  employed  eligible  beneficiaries,  except  that  this  clause  shall  not
apply to a person whose  only interest is as a limited partner.
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bought  a  signatory's  mining  assets).63  As  relevant  here,  the  Coal  Act
explicitly  imposed liability on successors  to "related  persons" but included
no  such  provision  for  imposing  liability  generally  on  successors  to
"signatory  operators"  themselves. 64   Instead,  the  Act  imposed  tailored
forms of liability upon successors  to two very carefully drawn  subclasses of
signatory operators.65  Applying standard maxims of negative  implication,66
the  Court  reasoned  that  "[w]here  Congress  wanted  to  provide  successor
liability in the...  Act, it did so explicitly."67
Justice Stevens again dissented.  For him, Barnhart  "raise[d]  the question
whether clear  evidence of coherent  congressional  intent should  inform the
Court's  construction  of a  statutory provision  that seems,  at  first blush,  to
convey  an incoherent  message." 68  For several reasons,  his answer was that
clear intent rather than apparent semantic  import should govern here.  First,
he noted that the Court's reading of the statute precluded  the Commissioner
of Social  Security,  the  official  charged  with  administering  the Act,  from
generally assigning liability to a signatory operator's successor in interest-
"the  most logical  recipient  of liability,  after  the  signatory  itself." '69  More
dramatically, while  relieving a direct successor of any such  obligation, the
Court's reading imposed  such responsibility  on a successor  in  interest of a
signatory's  corporate  affiliate  ("a  related  person").70   Thus,  as  Justice
Stevens  explained,  if a signatory  coal  operator  had  been  affiliated  with  a
dairy (such that the dairy was a "related person"), and if each company then
sold  its  assets  to  different  buyers,  the  Act  would  assign  financial
responsibility  for the signatory's retirees to the dairy's successor, but not to
the signatory's successor. 71 "If that result is not absurd," he observed, "it  is
surely incoherent.  Why would Congress order such an odd result?" 72
63.  Barnhart,  534 U.S.  at 448.
64.  See  26 U.S.C.  § 9701(c)(2)(A)  ("A  related  person shall  also  include a successor  in
interest  of any person  described  in  [the  'related  persons'  definition]  in  clause  (i),  (ii),  or
(iii).").
65.  First, the Act explicitly provides for the liability of post-enactment succesors:
If a person becomes  a successor of an  assigned  operator  after the enactment date
[of the  Act],  the  assigned  operator  may  transfer  the  assignment  of an  eligible
beneficiary  ...to  such  successor,  and  such  successor  shall  be  treated  as  the
assigned  operator  with  respect  to  such  eligible  beneficiary  for purposes  of this
chapter.
Id.  § 9706(b)(2).  Second, another provision specifies the obligations of Individual Employer
Plans under the  1978 or any subsequent agreement.  For purposes of that provision, the Act
specifies that "[t]he  term  'last signatory operator'  shall include  a successor in interest of such
operator."  Id. § 9711 (g)(1).
66.  See supra text accompanying note 46.
67.  Barnhart,  534 U.S. at 452-53.
68.  Id. at 462  (Stevens,  J., dissenting).
69.  Id. at 465.
70.  Id.
71.  Id.
72.  Id.
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Second,  two of the  bill's Senate  sponsors  made  floor  statements  further
suggesting  that  "Congress  did  not  intend  this  result. '73  Each  sponsor
unmistakably  stated  to  his  colleagues  that  "signatory  operators"  would
include  successors  in interest.74  For Justice  Stevens,  this  fact  dovetailed
importantly with his commonsense evaluation of the legislation itself:
If we  assume that  [the two sponsors]  correctly understood  their work
product,  the provision  is coherent. For it is obviously sensible  to impose
the cost of health  care benefits  on successors  to  signatory operators,  and
equally  obvious  that  there  is  far  less  justification  for  imposing  such
liability  on  successors  to related  companies  that are not  engaged  in  coal
mining.
75
For  the  Court  to  disregard  the  sponsors'  statements,  moreover,  was
"disrespectful,  not only to those  Senators,  but to  the entire  Senate  as well.
For...  it apparently  assumes  that  the Senators  were  either dissembling  or
unable  to understand the meaning  of the bill that they were sponsoring." 76
Since no  Senator rose  to the floor  to dispute  the sponsors'  account, Justice
Stevens found it quite unlikely  that they "misdescribed  the coverage of the
Act.",
77
Third,  imposing  liability  on  successors  would  bring  the  Act's
interpretation  into  harmony  with  the  interpretation  "consistently  endorsed
by the several Commissioners responsible  for the administration of the Act"
and  with  "the  Court's  treatment  of  successorship  issues  in  other  labor
cases."'78  And by  assigning  retired miners to  a signatory's  successors,  the
dissent's  reading  would  help  to  avoid  replicating  the  problems  of
unassigned retirees that inspired the Act's enactment  in the first place.79
Although Justice Stevens  admirably attempted to find a textual  home for
his position in the Dictionary Act's default rule that the term "corporations"
includes  successors  in interest, 80 it is clear that his result did not (and could
73.  Id.
74.  See  id. at  466  (footnote  omitted).  As  Justice  Stevens's  dissent  highlights,  the
sponsors'  statements were quite explicit:
Senator  Rockefeller  of West Virginia,  who  spoke "as  the  original  author of this
legislation,"  138  Cong.  Rec.  34034  (1992),  unambiguously  stated that  the  term
"signatory  operator"  includes  "a  successor  in  interest  of such  operator."  Id. at
34033.  And  in  a  written  explanation  of the  measure  that  he  placed  in  the
Congressional  Record,  Senator  Malcolm  Wallop  stated  that  the definition  of the
term  "related  person"  was  "intentionally  very  broad"  and  encompassed
"successors  to  the  collective  bargaining  agreement  obligations  of  a  signatory
operator."
Id.
75.  Id. at 467.
76.  Id. at 469.
77.  Id.
78.  Id. at 470-71.
79.  Id.  at 471-72.
80.  His textual claim was as follows:
The  Coal  Act  defines  a  "signatory  operator"  as  "a  person  which  is  or  was  a
signatory to a coal wage agreement."  26 U.S.C. § 9701(c)(1)  (1994  ed.).  The term
"person"  is  not  defined,  but  according  to  the  Dictionary  Act  it  includes
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not) depend  on that  conclusion.81  In particular, Justice  Stevens  closed his
dissent  with  the  following  observation,  which  further  illuminates  his
general approach to statutes:
In my judgment the holding  in this case  is the product of a  misguided
approach  to  issues  of  statutory  construction.  The  text  of  the  statute
provides  us with  evidence  that  is usually  sufficient to  disclose  the intent
of  the  enacting  Congress,  but  that  is  not  always  the  case.  There  are
occasions  when an exclusive focus on text seems to convey  an incoherent
message,  but other  reliable  evidence  clarifies  the  statute  and avoids  the
apparent incoherence.  In such a case...  we should never permit a narrow
focus  on  text  to  obscure  a  commonsense  appraisal  of that  additional
evidence.
82
D.  Summary
Three  features  emerge  from  Justice  Stevens's  decisions,  of which  the
foregoing dissents are fairly  representative.  First, he believes  that when the
semantic  import  of a  statutory  text  collides  with persuasive  evidence  of a
contrary  legislative purpose  or  intent, the  latter  must prevail.83  Congress
"corporations,  companies,  associations,  firms,  partnerships,  societies,  and  joint
stock  companies,  as  well  as  individuals."  1 U.S.C.  §  1.  And,  we  know  from  1
U.S.C.  § 5 that "[t]he word  'company'  or 'association',  when used in reference  to a
corporation, shall be deemed to embrace the words  'successors and assigns of such
company or association',  in like manner as if these last-named words, or words of
similar import, were  expressed."  Therefore,  reading the term  "signatory  operator"
to encompass direct successors  is compatible  with the default  rules that Congress
provided for interpreting  its statutes.
Id. at 469-70.
81.  Even if the Dictionary Act provides a generic default rule for understanding the term
"company"  or "corporation,"  the specific  text of the Coal Act requires  a different result.  In
particular, there is no way to make textual  sense of the  Coal Act's many specific provisions
prescribing  carefully tailored  liability  for  successors  of signatories  or their  related persons
under the  Act if successors of signatories  were covered  under the more  general  default rule
prescribed  by  the Dictionary  Act. See, e.g.,  Gozlon-Peretz  v.  United States, 498  U.S.  395,
407 (1991)  ("A  specific provision controls one of more general  application.");  Radzanower
v.  Touche  Ross  &  Co.,  426  U.S.  148,  153  (1976)  ('Where  there  is  no  clear  intention
otherwise,  a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general  one, regardless of
the priority of enactment."' (quoting Morton v. Mancari,  417 U.S. 535,  550-51  (1974))).
82.  Barnhart,  534 U.S. at 472 (Stevens, J.,  dissenting).
83.  See, e.g., Koons Buick Pontiac  GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S.  50,  65 (2004) (Stevens,
J.,  concurring)  ("In  recent  years  the  Court  has  suggested  that  we  should  only  look  at
legislative  history for the purpose of resolving textual  ambiguities or to avoid  absurdities.  It
would  be  wiser  to  acknowledge  that  it  is  always  appropriate  to  consider  all  available
evidence  of Congress'  true  intent  when interpreting  its work  product.");  United  States  v.
Wells,  519  U.S.  482,  511  (1997)  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)  (noting with approval  that  "the
Court  has  routinely  rejected  literal  statutory  interpretations  that  would  lead  to  anomalous
results").  In  Chapman  v.  United  States,  500  U.S.  453,  476-77  (1991)  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting),  Justice  Stevens  approvingly  quoted  several  cases  that  nicely  capture  his
approach:
In  construing  a  statute,  Learned  Hand  wisely  counseled  us  to  look first  to  the
words  of the  statute,  but  "not  to  make  a  fortress  out  of the  dictionary;  but  to
remember  that statutes always have  some purpose  or object  to accomplish, whose
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does not always  state  its intentions  precisely,  and a  faithful  agent  must be
on watch for evidence of legislative  inadvertence.  Second,  in determining
when  Congress  has  misspoken,  the  Court  should  ascribe  a  rather  robust
presumption  of reasonableness  and  coherence  in legislative  outcomes.  In
that sense,  he falls within the Legal Process tradition of Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
and  Albert  M.  Sacks,  who  urged  courts  to  assume  that legislation  is  the
product of "reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably." 84
To Justice Stevens,  it did not make sense to have an obvious calendar-year-
sympathetic  and  imaginative  discovery  is  the  surest  guide  to  their  meaning."
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737,  739 (CA2), aff'd, 326 U.S.  404 (1945).  In the
past, we have  recognized that "frequently  words of general meaning are used  in a
statute,  words broad enough to include an act in question,  and yet a consideration
of...  the  absurd  results  which  follow  from  giving  such  broad  meaning  to  the
words,  makes it unreasonable  to believe  that the  legislator intended to include  the
particular  act." Church of Holy Trinity v.  United  States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
These  words  guided  our construction  of the  statute  at  issue  in Public Citizen v.
Department of Justice, 491  U.S.  440,  454 (1989),  when  we  also  noted  that
"[l]ooking beyond the naked text for guidance  is perfectly proper when  the result it
apparently  decrees  is  difficult  to  fathom  or  where  it  seems  inconsistent  with
Congress'  intention .... "
Id.  Similarly,  in  Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507  U.S.  511,  518  n.12  (1993)  (Stevens,  J.),  Justice
Stevens wrote  as follows:
A jurisprudence  that confines  a court's  inquiry to the "law  as  it is  passed,"  and is
wholly  unconcerned  about  "the  intentions  of  legislators,"  would  enforce  an
unambiguous  statutory  text  even  when  it  produces  manifestly  unintended  and
profoundly  unwise  consequences.  Respondents  have  argued  that  this  is  such  a
case.  We  disagree.  Justice  Scalia,  however,  is  apparently willing  to assume  that
this is such a case, but would nevertheless  conclude that we have  a duty to enforce
the  statute  as  written  even  if fully  convinced  that every  Member of the  enacting
Congress,  as well  as the President  who  signed the Act,  intended a different result.
Again, we disagree.
Id. (citations omitted).
84.  Henry  M.  Hart,  Jr.  &  Albert  M.  Sacks,  The  Legal  Process  1378  (William  N.
Eskridge,  Jr.  &  Philip  P.  Frickey  eds.,  1994)  (1958).  For  discussion  of the  post-war
influence  of these  materials,  see,  for example,  T. Alexander  Aleinikoff, Updating  Statutory
Interpretation,  87  Mich.  L. Rev.  20,  26-27  (1988)  (discussing  the  impact of the Hart  and
Sacks materials),  and William N. Eskridge,  Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship
and Pedagogy  in the Post-Legal  Process Era,  48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 691,  698-99 (1987)  (same).
Along  these  lines,  it  is  surely  also  plausible  to think  of Justice  Stevens's  presumption  of
coherence  as a normatively rooted presumption about how judges should read the legislative
process,  rather  than  a  descriptive  account  of how  the  process  actually  works.  Certainly,
others  have  suggested  that  such  an  account  explains  Legal  Process  purposivism,  which
mirrors  Justice  Stevens's  own  approach.  See,  e.g.,  Daniel  A. Farber  & Philip  P.  Frickey,
Foreword:  Positive Political  Theory in the Nineties, 80  Geo. L.J.  457, 475  (1992)  (noting
"the  possibility  that  Hart  and  Sacks  were  not  so  much  panglossian  empiricists  as  savvy
normativists-crafters  of assumptions  that provide  useful judicial and  administrative  side-
constraints upon the less attractive features of politics"); Peter L.  Strauss, The Common Law
and Statutes, 70  U.  Colo.  L.  Rev.  225,  242  (1999)  (suggesting  that  the  Legal  Process
approach  reflects  a  "normative  statement  prescribing  proper  attitudes  for judges  in  their
dealing  with the work of legislatures,  rather than a positive one  describing what legislatures
are").  Even if one understands  Justice  Stevens's  presumption  of coherence  in  that light, I
argue  below  that  a  competing  normative  presumption-that  legislation  typically  reflects
untidy  compromise-makes  more sense  of the  constitutional  structure  than  does  the Legal
Process presumption of reasonable coherence. See infra Part III.A-B.
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end  filing  requirement  that  expired  before  the  close  of  business  on
December  31; it did not make  sense to provide  for attorney's  fees but deny
the  use  of experts  who  could  provide  lower-cost  substitutes  for  attorney
services;  it did not make sense to assign mine industry retirees to successors
of  non-coal  companies  that  had  been  affiliated  with  signatory  coal
operators,  but  not  to  the  successors  of  the  signatories  themselves.
Underlying  each  dissent is  a strong  sense  that federal  courts  should act  as
though  Congress  behaves  coherently,  even  when  the  semantic  detail
suggests  otherwise.85  Third,  in  determining  legislative  intent,  he  finds  it
appropriate  if  not  necessary  to  consult  a  statute's  internal  legislative
history-particularly  the  authoritative  statements  of the  committees  and
sponsors  responsible  for  framing  bills.86  For  Justice  Stevens,  statutory
85.  One  further example  illustrates  this phenomenon  with particular clarity.  In United
States v.  Wells,  519  U.S.  482,  486  (1997),  the  Court  construed  18  U.S.C.  §  1014  (1994),
which  criminalizes  knowingly  making  any  "false  statement  or  report"  to  a  bank  for  the
purpose  of  securing  a  loan.  At  issue  was  whether  the  statute  contained  a  materiality
requirement.  The Court  found that because the false statement  statute contained  no express
materiality  requirement,  "the  natural  reading"  did not include  such an element.  Wells,  519
U.S.  at 492.  More important,  the Court noted that when Congress enacted  § 1014  as part of
the  1948  recodification  of the  Criminal  Code,  "it  explicitly  included  materiality  in  other
provisions."  Id.  Indeed,  §1014  itself  was  a  composite  of more  than  a  dozen  previous
provisions,  most  but not  all  of which  had  lacked  a  materiality  requirement  prior  to  the
recodification.  See  id.  In  consolidating  those  provisions  that  were  to  become  § 1014,
Congress  dropped  the materiality  requirement  from  all  of them, leading  the  Court to  infer
that Congress had done so "deliberately."  Id. at 493.  The Court thus used the classic process
of negative  implication  to  draw inferences  from  the  disparate  inclusion  and  omission of a
materiality  requirement  in  various  statutory  provisions.  For  Justice  Stevens,  disparate
inclusion  and omission  of an  express materiality  requirement  is  not evidence  of deliberate
contrast  but  rather  of  unintended  legislative  deviation  from  an  otherwise  coherent
background policy.  Surveying  the entire  body of federal  criminal  statutes,  Justice  Stevens
wrote as follows:
[A]t  least  100 federal  false  statement  statutes may  be found  in the  United States
Code.  About  42  of  them  contain  an  express  materiality  requirement;
approximately  54  do not. The kinds of false statements  found  in the first category
are, to my eyes at least,  indistinguishable  from those in the  second category.  Nor
is there  any obvious  distinction between the  range  of punishments  authorized by
the two different groups of statutes ....  It seems farfetched that Congress made a
deliberate  decision  to  include  or to  omit a  materiality requirement  every time  it
created  a false  statement  offense.  Far more  likely,  in my view,  Congress  simply
assumed...  that the materiality requirement would be implied wherever it was not
explicit.
Id. at 505-09 (Stevens, J.,  dissenting).
86.  Justice Stevens  has suggested  that in casting their  votes,  legislators justifiably rely
on the views expressed by committees and sponsors:
Legislators,  like  other  busy  people,  often  depend  on  the  judgment  of trusted
colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities.  If a statute  such as the
Expedited Funds  Availability  Act  has  bipartisan  support  and  has been  carefully
considered  by  committees  familiar  with  the  subject  matter,  Representatives  and
Senators may appropriately  rely on the views of the committee members in casting
their votes.  In such circumstances,  since most Members are content to endorse the
views  of the  responsible committees,  the  intent of those  involved in the  drafting
process is properly regarded as the intent of  the entire Congress.
2006] 2025FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
interpretation  is  a holistic endeavor,  guided  by the premise that  legislative
policymaking tends to be  reasonably coherent,  that statutory  drafting  tends
to be  messy and  imprecise,  and that a  true  faithful agent  properly corrects
apparent  infelicities  in  drafting  to  make  a  statute  more  coherent  with  its
own apparent purposes and with relevant policies reflected in other laws.
Certainly,  that  approach  had  become  orthodox  well  before  Justice
Stevens  took his seat on the  Court three decades ago-and  remained so for
some  time thereafter.87  Starting from the inception of the Rehnquist Court
nearly two decades ago, however, the Court has moved noticeably although
not single-mindedly  in a different direction.  Rather than deviating from the
clear semantic import of the enacted  text, the Court's more recent decisions
have tended instead  to emphasize  that the legislative process  is opaque and
path  dependent,  that  virtually  all  laws  entail  compromise,  and  that
compromises  are frequently  messy rather than coherent.  So it takes the text
as it finds it rather than imposing purpose-driven coherence on a messy text.
Because  the  Court's  "new  textualism" 88 represents  the  most  serious  post-
war  challenge to  the tradition of purposivism practiced by Justice  Stevens,
no examination of his interpretive approach would be complete without also
considering that counter-tradition.
Bank One Chi., N.A.  v. Midwest Bank & Trust  Co., 516  U.S. 264,  276-77 (1996)  (Stevens,
J.,  concurring).  In City of Chicago v.  Environmental  Defense Fund, 511  U.S.  328,  345 n.7
(1994)  (Stevens, J.,  dissenting), moreover, Justice Stevens advanced  a similar justification:
The  purpose of a  committee  report  is  to provide  the  Members  of Congress  who
have  not  taken  part  in  the  committee's  deliberations  with  a  summary  of  the
provisions  of the bill and the reasons  for the committee's recommendation that the
bill should become  law.  The report obviously does  not have the force of law.  Yet
when  the text of a bill is not changed  after  it leaves  the committee,  the Members
are entitled to assume that the report fairly summarizes the proposed legislation.
Id.
87.  See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. United  States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452-53  (1989)
(concluding  that an acquaintance  with the Federal  Advisory Committee Act's "purposes, as
manifested  by its  legislative history and as recited in ...  the Act, reveals that it cannot have
been  Congress'  intention"  to adopt  the  conventional  import  of the word  "utilize");  CIR v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563,  571  (1965)  ("Unquestionably  the courts, in interpreting  a statute,  have
some scope for adopting a restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where
acceptance  of that meaning  would  lead to  absurd  results  ...  or would  thwart the  obvious
purpose  of  the  statute."  (internal  quotation  omitted));  Int'l  Longshoremen's  &
Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp.,  342 U.S. 237, 243  (1952)  ("That reading of
the  Act  does  not,  to  be  sure,  take  the  words  . . . in  their  historic,  technical  sense.  But
literalness  is no sure  touchstone  of legislative  purpose.  The purpose  here  is more  closely
approximated, we believe, by giving the historic phrase a looser, more  liberal meaning in the
special  context  of this  legislation.");  United  States  v.  Carbone,  327  U.S.  633,  637  (1946)
("[N]ot  every person or act  falling  within the literal sweep of the ...  Act necessarily comes
within its  intent and purpose.  That language  must be read and applied  in light of the evils
which gave rise to the statute and the aims which the proponents  sought to achieve.").  This
interpretive tradition, of course, also underpinned the Court's highly influential Holy Trinity
decision. See supra text accompanying  notes 7-17.
88.  The terminology  is attributed to  William N. Eskridge,  Jr.,  The New  Textualism, 37
UCLA L. Rev. 621  (1990).
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II.  THE PRESUMPTION  OF DELIBERATE  DRAFTING AND MESSY
COMPROMISE
Because  I have extensively  discussed the  premises of modem textualism
in previous writings,  I will sketch the textualist position in brief here.  The
central  premise  of modem  textualism  is  that the  Court  must  enforce  the
statute  as  written  rather  than  trying  to  adjust  it  to  reflect  a  background
purpose  drawn  from  the  overall  tenor  of the  statute,  its title,  or, perhaps
especially,  its  legislative  history.  This  approach  rests  on  an  apparent
presumption  that legislators  choose the  words of a  statute  for a reason  and
that  a complex  and opaque  legislative process  can be  expected  to produce
rough-hewn  compromises  that  do  not necessarily  capture  a  fully  coherent
set of policy goals.  To oversimplify  a bit, when the semantic  meaning of a
statute is clear, for textualists that is the end of the matter.89
The  formal  basis  for  this  position  has  perhaps  been  most  clearly
expressed by the Court's  leading textualist, Justice  Scalia, who emphasizes
that  "[w]e  are  governed  by  laws,  not  by  the  intentions of legislators....
'The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only
mode  in which that will is spoken is in the act itself  "'90  In  other words,
because  Article  I, Section  7,  of the  Constitution  prescribes  a  specific  and
rather elaborate method of enacting laws-bicameralism  and presentment-
89.  The  statement  in text is  an  oversimplification  for  two  reasons:  First,  the  Court's
textualists subscribe  to some version of the notion that the  federal  courts may depart  from
the clear import of the enacted text to avoid an absurd result. See,  e.g., City of Columbus v.
Ours  Garage & Wrecking  Serv.,  Inc.,  536  U.S. 424,  449 n.4  (2002) (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting)
("A possibility so startling (and unlikely to occur) is well enough precluded by the rule that a
statute  should not be interpreted to produce absurd  results.");  INS  v. Cardoza-Fonseca,  480
U.S.  421,  452  (1987)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  the  judgment)  (noting  that  courts  may
properly depart  from the plain meaning  of a statute  in order to avoid a "patent absurdity").  I
have criticized  that position  rather extensively  in a prior  article. See John F.  Manning,  The
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv.  L.  Rev.  2387 (2003).  Second, textualists  sometimes invoke
so-called  "clear  statement  rules"---constitutionally  inspired  (but  not  required)  canons  of
construction  that  push  interpreters  away  from  interpretations  that  risk  intrusion  upon
constitutional  values  such as  federalism.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v. Nordic  Vill.,  Inc.,  503
U.S.  30,  33-34 (1992)  (Scalia,  J.)  (requiring  clear statement  of legislative  intent to waive
federal  sovereign  immunity); Kaiser  Aluminum  & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo,  494 U.S.  827,
841  (1990)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring)  (presuming  that  statutes  apply  prospectively  absent  a
clear indication  to the  contrary);  Dellmuth  v. Muth,  491  U.S.  223,  233  (1989)  (Scalia,  J.,
concurring) (stressing  that Congress  may eliminate  sovereign  immunity  under Section 5 of
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  if the  statutory  text  "clearly  subjects"  the  state  to  suit  for
damages).  Although the legitimacy of such  canons is beyond the  scope of this Essay, I note
that a growing body of scholarship criticizing the canon of constitutional  avoidance tends to
raise  basic  questions  about the  consistency  of clear statement  rules  with  the  premises  of
textualism.  See,  e.g.,  Jerry  L.  Mashaw,  Greed,  Chaos,  and  Governance  102-05  (1997)
(relying on game theory to demonstrate the distorting  effect of clear statement rules such as
the canon of avoidance);  Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995  Sup. Ct. Rev.  71,  74
(noting that  "it  is by  no  means  clear  that  a strained  interpretation  of a federal  statute  that
avoids a constitutional  question  is any less  a judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation
on constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute").
90.  Conroy  v.  Aniskoff,  507  U.S.  511,  519  (1993)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  the
judgment) (quoting Aldridge  v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845)).
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the  language  that  emerges  from  that  process  has  a  singular  claim  to
legitimate  authority,  at  least  when  the  resulting  text  is  clear.  As  Justice
Scalia  has  put  it,  the  enacted  text  always  trumps  "unenacted  legislative
intent." 91
91.  Cardoza-Fonseca,  480  U.S.  at  453  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  the judgment).  In  a
recent  article,  I  argued  that textualists  speak  with  some  (ultimately  harmless)  imprecision
when they cast their approach as one that favors the enacted  text over unenacted extratextual
materials. See John F. Manning,  What Divides Textualistsfrom Purposivists,  106 Colum.  L.
Rev.  71  (2006).  Because  modem textualists recognize  that the meaning of all texts depends
on  context,  the more  accurate  account of their position  is  that  interpreters  should resolve
latent  ambiguities  in  text  by  first  examining  semantic  context-evidence  of the  way  a
reasonable  person  would  use  the  enacted  words  in  context.  Id.  at  92-94.  When  such
evidence yields a clear answer to an interpretive question, textualists would generally give  it
precedence over policy context-evidence  about the way a reasonable person would address
the  mischief at  which  the  statute  is directed.  See  id. at  92-93.  Ultimately,  the  proposed
change in emphasis may itself be a mere matter of semantics. See id. at 77,  95.  For whether
one frames  the question  as text versus purpose  or semantic  versus policy context,  the basic
justification  for  textualism  remains  intact:  Even  if textualists  ultimately  choose  between
competing elements  context, their  approach  finds ample justification  in the fact that respect
for a statute's clearly expressed  semantic  detail affords legislators the only reliable means to
strike predictable  compromises  in the  legislative  process.  See  id. at  103-05.  If legislators
with the power to insist upon a compromise wish to strike a bargain about the contours to the
policy  they  find acceptable,  they must be able to agree  upon  words that  will reliably frame
that policy at an appropriate level of generality. See infra Part III.A.
In  a  characteristically  thoughtful  essay  appearing  in  this  Symposium,  Professor  Abner
Greene suggests  that  the distinction  between  semantic  meaning and  background purpose  is
less meaningful than textualists claim. See Abner S. Greene,  The Missing Step of Textualism,
74 Fordham  L.  Rev.  1913,  1916-22 (2006).  In particular, he argues  that because  textualists
acknowledge  that statutes  have meaning  only in context, they are able  to rely on assertions
about contextual nuance to sneak purposive  analysis into their assessment of word meaning.
See id.  Although  full  consideration  of his provocative  contention  is beyond  this  Essay's
scope,  I  believe  that  Professor  Greene's  analysis  underestimates  the  extent  to  which
textualists  give  priority to  semantic  elements  of context  (evidence  about the  way speakers
use language),  even when  it  contradicts  the policy  elements of context (evidence  about the
way speakers would solve problems addressed by the language). See Manning, supra, at 92-
96.  Faithfully  applied, this  ordering  of priority continues  to differentiate  textualism  from
traditional methods of purposivism. See Manning,  supra  note 89,  at 2462-64  (explaining the
constraints produced by an emphasis on conventional semantic usage).
Along  these  lines,  it  is  worth  pausing  to  clarify  a  point  made  in  my  earlier work.  In
response  to  my prior writing, see Manning,  supra note  4,  at  111  n.434,  Professor  Greene
invokes a hypothetical asking  how a subordinate  should interpret a hotel manager's  directive
to "gather  all the ashtrays in the  public areas of the hotel."  See Greene,  supra, at  1921; see
also  Gerald  C.  MacCallum,  Jr.,  Legislative Intent,  75  Yale  L.J.  754,  771-72  (1966)
(proposing that  example);  William N.  Eskridge,  Jr.,  Textualism:  The  Unknown Ideal?, 96
Mich. L. Rev.  1509,  1549 (1997)  (book review) (elaborating upon the  ashtray hypothetical).
In  particular,  as  Professor  Greene  notes,  I had  suggested that  a  textualist  would  disfavor
ripping out ashtrays  that were bolted to  the walls  because "no  reasonable user of language
would use or understand  the phrase 'gather  all ashtrays from  the public  spaces,'  in context,
to  mean  movable  and  nonmovable  ashtrays."  Manning,  supra  note  4,  at  111  n.434.
Professor  Greene  argues  that  my  conclusion  demonstrates  the  thinness  of the textualists'
distinction  between  semantic  and  policy  considerations.  As  I clarified  in  later  writing,
however,  the  ashtray  hypothetical,  properly  understood,  is  ultimately  inapposite  to  the
appropriate method of statutory interpretation. See Manning supra note 89,  at 2462-63  n.274.
That  hypothetical  of course  builds  on  Grice's  proposition  that  when  speakers  violate  the
"cooperative  principle"  of conversation,  a  listener  is  sometimes  justified  in  assigning  an
unconventional meaning  to the  speaker's utterance.  See supra note 25 (discussing  Grice).  In
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Behind this  formal  theory  of the  constitutional  structure  lies  a theory of
the  way  the  political  process  works.  In  the judicial  opinions  of Justice
Scalia, two major premises  about the legislative process predominate.  First,
virtually  all laws  reflect  some form of compromise,  and  compromises  tend
to be awkward precisely because  they typically split the difference between
competing positions.92  This premise, if sustainable, makes it quite difficult
to presume,  as purposivists  do,  that  a  statute's  seemingly  over-  or under-
inclusive  rules  have  "inadvertently"  fallen  short  of  some  overarching
background purpose.  As  Justice  Scalia has  written, "[t]he  final  form of a
statute ...  is often the result of compromise  among various interest groups,
resulting  in  a  decision  to  go  so  far  and  no  farther."93   If  so,  then
"[d]eduction  from the 'broad  purpose'  of a statute begs the  question if it is
used to decide by what means (and hence to what length) Congress pursued
that purpose;  to get the right  answer to that  question there  is no substitute
for the hard job..  . of reading  the  whole text."'94  Or as the  Court's  other
leading  textualist,  Justice  Clarence  Thomas,  made  clear  in  the  previously
discussed Barnhart case,  where  compromise  is present,  the  contours  of a
statute  may  reflect  the  imperatives  of the  political  process  rather  than  a
logical ordering of legislative policy:
[N]egotiations  surrounding  enactment  of this  bill  tell  a  typical  story  of
legislative  battle among  interest groups,  Congress, and the President ....
As  such,  a change  in  any individual  provision could have  unraveled  the
whole.  It  is  quite  possible  that  a  [different]  bill  . . . would  not  have
survived the  legislative process.  The deals brokered  during  a Committee
markup, on  the floor of the two Houses,  during a joint House and  Senate
Conference,  or in negotiations with the President, however,  are not for us
to judge or second-guess.
95
To  preserve  a  potential  compromise,  the  Court's  textualists  deem  it
necessary  to hew closely to the semantic  meaning of the only text that has
cleared  Article  I's requirements  of bicameralism  and presentment,  as well
as the many complex legislative rules that supplement that process.96
view of Grice's "maxim of quality,"  the listener might  infer  that the  request to  collect "all
the ashtrays"  rested on a false factual assumption  that "all"  the relevant  ashtrays were  loose
and thus easy to retrieve. See Manning, supra note  89, at 2462 n.274.  Grice's assumptions
about such  seemingly awkward  utterances,  however,  do not translate well  from  the context
of individual communication  to that of legislation.  See id. at  2462-63  n.274.  Because  the
final content  of a  statutory text  may  reflect  a  bargaining process  that  splits the  difference
between  sharply conflicting views or papers  over deeply  felt disagreements, it is  unrealistic
to equate  the awkwardness of a statute with the kind of linguistic inadvertence that a listener
might reasonably ascribe to an individual in a cooperative conversational  setting. See id.
92.  See Courtney  Simmons,  Unmasking the Rhetoric of Purpose: The  Supreme Court
and  Legislative Compromise, 44 Emory L.J.  117,  126  (1995).
93.  E. Assocs.  Coal Corp. v. United Mine  Workers,  531  U.S.  57,  68-69 (2000) (Scalia,
J.,  concurring in the judgment).
94.  Babbitt v. Sweet Home  Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.,  515 U.S. 687,  726 (1995)
(Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).
95.  Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc.,  534 U.S. 438,461  (2002).
96.  See infra Part II1.A.
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Second,  textualists tend to  believe that the post-New  Deal  Court's most
common source  for identifying purpose-a bill's  legislative history-does
not  reliably  reflect  Congress's  desires  and  is  otherwise  of  dubious
constitutional  legitimacy.  Again,  Justice  Scalia  has  taken  the  lead.  For
him, the  use of legislative  history presents  a Catch-22  for the purposivist.
Either  it  is  invoked  because  it  is  mere  evidence  of  how  Congress
understood  the  words  it  enacted,  in  which  case  legislative  history  is
typically an unreliable barometer.97  Or if (as Justice Stevens has suggested)
rank-and-file  legislators accept the statements of committees  or sponsors as
authoritative  expressions  of the majority's  position, then the concern shifts
from one of evidentiary  unreliability to one of constitutional dimension:
[A]ssuming  [that]  . . . [Congress]  desire[s]  to  leave  details  to  the
committees,  the very first provision of the Constitution forbids  it. Article
I, §  1, provides  that  "[a]ll  legislative  Powers  herein  granted  shall  be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House  of Representatives."  It has  always  been assumed  that  these
powers  are nondelegable-or,  as John Locke put it,  that legislative power
consists  of the  power  "to  make  laws,  . . . not  to  make  legislators."  J.
Locke,  Second  Treatise  of Government  87  (R.  Cox  ed.  1982).  No one
would  think  that  the  House  of Representatives  could  operate  in  such
fashion that only the broad outlines  of bills  would be  adopted by vote  of
the  full  House,  leaving  minor  details  to  be  written,  adopted,  and voted
upon  only by  the cognizant  committees.  Thus,  if legislation  consists of
forming  an "intent" rather than adopting a text (a proposition with which I
do  not  agree),  Congress  cannot  leave  the  formation  of that  intent  to  a
small  band  of its  number,  but must,  as  the  Constitution  says,  form  an
intent of the  Congress. 98
For Justice Scalia, then, either legislative history supplies faulty evidence of
congressional  intent or is unconstitutionally treated by courts as if it does.
Much the way Justice Stevens's purposivism is captured by the academic
and judicial  writings  of  Judge  Posner,  Justice  Scalia's  textualism  finds
thoughtful  corroboration  in  the  work  of  Posner's  colleague  on  the
University  of  Chicago  law  faculty  and  the  Seventh  Circuit,  Judge
97.  Even  with  what  the  Court  long  regarded  as  the  most  authoritative  evidence  of
legislative  intent-the reports of the responsible  legislative  committees-Justice  Scalia  has
thought it  "most unlikely  that many Members  of either Chamber  [have]  read the pertinent
portions of the Committee Reports before voting on the bill-assuming...  that the Reports
were available  before  the vote." Wis. Pub.  Intervenor v. Mortier, 501  U.S.  597,  620 (1991)
(Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in the judgment);  see also, e.g.,  W.  Va.  Univ. Hosps.  v.  Casey, 499
U.S.  83,  98-99  (1991)  (Scalia,  J.)  ("Where  [the  statute]  contains  a  phrase  that  is
unambiguous-that  has  a  clearly  accepted  meaning  in  both  legislative  and  judicial
practice-we  do not permit it to be expanded  or contracted by the statements [of purpose]  of
individual  legislators  or  committees  during  the  course  of  the  enactment  process.");
Blanchard v. Bergeron,  489 U.S.  87,  98  (1989)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring in part  and concurring
in the judgment)  ("I  am confident that only a small  proportion of the Members of Congress
read either one of the  Committee Reports  in question,  even  if (as is not always the case) the
Reports happened to have been published before the vote .... ").
98.  Bank  One  Chi.,  N.A.  v.  Midwest  Bank  & Trust  Co.,  516  U.S.  264,  280  (1996)
(Scalia, J.,  concurring  in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Easterbrook. 99  Building  on Arrovian  game  theory, 0  Judge  Easterbrook
emphasizes  that  the  legislative  process  is  opaque,  path-dependent,  and
highly  complex:  "Although  legislators  have  individual  lists  of  desires,
priorities,  and  preferences,  it  turns  out  to  be  difficult,  sometimes
impossible,  to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective  choice.  Every
system  of voting  has  flaws.  The  one  used  by  legislatures  is  particularly
dependent  on the order  in  which decisions  are  made." 1 0 1  In other  words,
the  precise  contours  of  legislative  policy  may  reflect  the  procedural
sequence  of legislative  events rather  than a frictionless  implementation  of
coherent  policy  impulses.  And  because  of the  deep  complexities  of  the
legislative process,  it may be difficult for judges after the  fact to retrace the
steps  of legislative process  to determine  what procedural  influences helped
shape  the  legislation.  Bills  must  "run  the  gamut  of the  process,"  which
involves  "committees,  fighting  for time  on the  floor, compromise because
other  members  want some  unrelated  objective,  passage,  exposure  to  veto,
and  so on."102  When one  adds strategic  behavior  such  as logrolling to the
mix, moreover,  "the  legislative  process  is  submerged  and  courts  lose  the
information  they  need  to  divine  the  body's  design." 103   Given  these
complexities,  Easterbrook thinks  it "impossible  for  a court--even  one  that
knows  each  legislators'  complete  table  of preferences-to  say  what  the
whole  body would have  done with a proposal it did not consider in fact."'104
If  correct,  this conclusion  in  turn casts  doubt on the  purposivist  idea  that
courts  can ascertain  with meaningful  accuracy  what  Congress would have
done  had  it  expressly  confronted  an  apparent  mismatch  between  a  clear
statutory text and the background purpose that inspired it.
Second, Judge Easterbrook makes the related-and, for present purposes,
highly  significant-points  that  most  law  requires  compromise,  that
compromise  goes  so  far  and  no  farther  in  pursuit of legislative  purposes,
and that abstracting from textually embedded rules to background purposes
may  in  fact  disturb  a  legislative  choice  to  specify  limits  on  a  desired
statutory  policy  in  order  to  secure  a  needed  compromise.  Because
99.  The discussion  in this paragraph  builds  on Manning, supra note  89,  at 2387, 2408-
19.
100.  See, e.g.,  Kenneth J. Arrow, Social  Choice and Individual Values (Yale  Univ. Press,
2d ed. 1963)  (1951).
101.  See  Frank  H.  Easterbrook,  Statutes'  Domains, 50  U.  Chi.  L.  Rev.  533,  547-48
(1983).
102.  Frank  H.  Easterbrook,  The  Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y  59, 64 (1988).
103.  Easterbrook, supra  note  101,  at 548.
104.  Id. at  547-48.  Where such premises hold,  it may be impossible to identify  what  the
legislature  collectively  regards  as  the "'best'  alternative,"  and  "the  final  outcome may  be
arbitrary  (for  example,  a  function  of group  fatigue)  or determined by  specific  institutional
features of decisionmaking  (for example,  rules governing the order of voting on motions)."
Kenneth  A.  Shepsle,  Congress Is a  "They,"  Not an  "It":  Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 Int'l  Rev. L. & Econ. 239,  241-42 (1992).  For an excellent  and largely critical appraisal
of the way Arrow's Theorem  is invoked in the interpretation  debate,  see Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 47-55 (1991).
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"[l]egislation  reflects  compromise  among  competing  interests,"  Judge
Easterbrook  argues  that  "[i]t  upsets  the  legislative  balance  to  push  the
outcome farther  in either direction."'105  Or put another  way, "law  is like a
vector.  It has  length  as well as direction.  We must find both, or we know
nothing  of value.  To  find  length  we  must take  account  of objectives,  of
means  chosen,  and  of stopping  places  identified."' 1 0 6  From  this  starting
point, Judge Easterbrook  maintains  that purposivism  disregards the role  of
compromise  in the  legislative process  by transforming  all rules (with more
or  less  definite  stopping  points)  into  standards  (with  more  or  less  open-
ended goals):
A legislature  that seeks to  achieve  Goal X can do so  in one  of two ways.
First,  it  can  identify  the  goal  and  instruct  courts  or  agencies  to  design
rules to achieve  the goal.  In that event,  the subsequent  selection of rules
implements  the actual  legislative  decision, even  if the rules are  not what
the legislature would have selected  itself.  The second  approach is for the
legislature  to pick the rules.  It pursues Goal  X by Rule Y.  The selection
of Y  is a measure  of what Goal  X was  worth to  the  legislature,  of how
best to  achieve  X,  and of where to stop  in pursuit of X.  Like any other
rule, Y  is bound to be imprecise,  to be over- and under-inclusive.  This is
not a good reason  for a court, observing the inevitable imprecision, to add
to or  subtract  from Rule  Y on the  argument that, by doing  so,  it can get
more of Goal X.  The judicial  selection  of means  to  pursue X displaces
and  directly  overrides  the  legislative  selection  of ways  to  obtain  X.  It
denies  to  legislatures  the  choice  of  creating  or  withholding  gapfilling
authority.  '
0 7
105.  Heath  v. Varity Corp.,  71  F.3d 256,  258  (7th Cir.  1995)  (Easterbrook, J.);  see also,
e.g., Hrubec  v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 1269,  1270 (7th Cir.  1995)  (Easterbrook,
J.)  ("Many laws are compromises, going thus far and no further in pursuit of a goal."); Frank
H. Easterbrook,  Foreword: The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-The Court and the Economic
System,  98 Harv.  L. Rev.  4, 46  (1984)  [hereinafter  Easterbrook, Foreword)  ("If legislation
grows out of compromises among  special interests ....  a court cannot add enforcement to get
more of what Congress wanted  ....  When a court observes that Congress propelled Group
X  part  way to  its  desired end,  it  cannot assist  Group X  farther along  the journey  without
undoing  the  structure  of the  deal.").  I  should  note  that  Judge  Easterbrook's  theory  of
legislation  sometimes  tends  to  emphasize  the  premises  of interest  group  theory,  which
suggests  that  legislation reflects  private  deals  among  competing  interest groups.  See, e.g.,
Frank  H.  Easterbrook,  The  State of Madison's Vision  of  the  State: A  Public Choice
Perspective, 107  Harv. L. Rev.  1328,  1346-47 (1994)  (arguing that "when  faction dominates
the creation  of laws,"  such laws  merely "reflect the outcome  of a bargaining process among
factions  (and  their representatives)").  It  should be noted  that one  can  expect  compromise
even  in  legislation  that  is  not dominated  by  well-organized  interest  groups.  As  Jeremy
Waldron  has  thus  written,  legislation  is  "the  product  of  a  multi-member  assembly,
comprising  a  large  number  of persons  of quite  radically  differing  aims,  interests,  and
backgrounds."  Jeremy  Waldron,  Law  and  Disagreement  125  (1999).  Accordingly,  any
statute's "specific  provisions"  might be "the result of compromise  and line-item voting." Id.
106.  Easterbrook, supra note  102,  at 63; see also, e.g.,  Contract Courier Servs. v. Res. &
Special  Programs  Admin.,  U.S.  Dep't  of Transp.,  924  F.2d  112,  115  (7th  Cir.  1991)
(Easterbrook,  J.)  ("Statutes  do more than  point  in  a direction,  such as  'more  safety'.  They
achieve  a particular amount of that objective,  at a particular cost in other interests.").
107.  Easterbrook, supra note 101,  at 546-47.
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Accordingly, when purposivists rely  on "an  imputed  'spirit'  to convert one
approach  into another,"  such an approach  "dishonors  the legislative  choice
as effectively as expressly refusing to follow the law."] 08
I have considered the merits and demerits of these process  assumptions at
length  in  earlier  writing,  and  I  will  add  but  a  few  words  below  about
competing purposivist and textualist theories of the legislative  process.  For
present,  it  suffices  to  note  that  the  Rehnquist  Court  tended  to  embrace
important  elements  of the  foregoing  textualist  critique  of purposivism. 1 0 9
In particular, that Court seemed firmly  to embrace  the  idea that legislation
entails often unknowable  and messy compromise,  and  that federal  courts in
a system premised on legislative supremacy  should respect the rules clearly
articulated  in  the  statutory  text,  even  if they  produce  awkward  results  at
odds with the statute's apparent purpose.  In particular, the Court now starts
from the premise that "[s]tatutes  are seldom crafted to pursue a single goal,
and  [that] compromises necessary  to their enactment may require  adopting
means  other  than  those  that  would  most  effectively  pursue  the  main
goal." 11 0  Accordingly,  the  Court  no  longer  finds  it appropriate  to use  a
statute's  "overarching  legislative  purpose"  to  smooth  over  the  inevitable
rough  spots  in  a  statutory  text.111   And  while  recognizing  that
dissatisfaction  with  a statute's  final  shape  "is  often  the  cost of legislative
compromise,"  the Court has made plain that "[t]he  deals brokered during a
Committee  markup,  on the  floor of the two Houses,  during  a joint House
and  Senate Conference,  or in negotiations with the President ...  are not for
[the  courts]  to judge  or  second-guess."' 112  Judges,  in  other  words,  "are
bound, not only by the ultimate purposes  Congress has  selected, but by the
means  it has  deemed  appropriate,  and  prescribed,  for the  pursuit of those
purposes." 113   To  be  sure,  the  Court  in  recent  years  has  issued  the
occasional opinion that reflects classic purposivism  of the sort practiced by
108.  Frank  H.  Easterbrook,  Text,  History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
Harv.  J.L.  & Pub.  Pol'y 61,  68  (1994);  see also, e.g., Walton  v.  United  Consumers  Club,
Inc.,  786  F.2d  303,  310  (7th  Cir.  1986)  (Easterbrook,  J.)  ("Courts  should  confine  their
attention to the purposes Congress sought to achieve by the words it used.").
109.  Hints of the present approach had begun to emerge near the end of the Burger Court.
In its final year, that Court thus unanimously  explained that
Congress  may  be  unanimous  in  its  intent  to  stamp  out  some  vague  social  or
economic  evil; however,  because its Members may differ sharply on the means  for
effectuating  that  intent,  the  final  language  of the  legislation  may  reflect  hard-
fought  compromises.  Invocation  of the  "plain  purpose"  of  legislation  at  the
expense  of the  terms  of the  statute  itself takes  no  account  of the  processes  of
compromise.
Bd. of Governors  of the  Fed.  Reserve  Sys.  v.  Dimension  Fin.  Corp.,  474  U.S.  361,  374
(1986).
110.  Landgraf  v.  USI  Film  Prods.,  511  U.S.  244,  286  (1994).  Indeed,  perhaps
surprisingly, the opinion for the Court in Landgraf  was written by Justice Stevens himself.
111.  Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438,  461 (2002).
112.  Id.
113.  MCI Telecomms.  Corp. v Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,  512 U.S. 218, 231  n.4 (1994).
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Justice Stevens.114  But textualist themes  about  legislative compromise  and
respecting  the  rules  embedded  in  the  text of  statutes  have  become  quite
familiar  in  the  Court's  opinions, l1 5  even  at  times  in  those  authored  by
Justices who would surely not count themselves as textualists.116
114.  See  Michael  C.  Dorf, The  Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The  Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv.  L. Rev.  4, 6-7  (1998)  (arguing  that the Court continues  to
have  an  eclectic  approach  to  statutory  interpretation).  For  recent  examples  of strongly
purposivist  reasoning, see  Johnson  v. United  States,  529 U.S.  694,  706  n.9  (2000) (Souter,
J.)  ("[I]n  relying  on  an  uncommon  sense  of the word,  we  are  departing  from  the  rule  of
construction that prefers  ordinary  meaning.  But this is exactly what ought to happen when
the  ordinary  meaning  fails  to  fit  the  text and  when the  realization  of clear congressional
policy  (here, favoring  the ability to  impose  supervised  release) is in  tension with  the result
that customary  interpretive  rules would  deliver."  (citation omitted)); Clinton  v. City of New
York, 524  U.S. 417,  428-29 (1998)  (broadening an  expedited  review provision because  the
literal  meaning  undermined  the  statutory  purpose  to  provide  "a  prompt  and  authoritative
judicial determination of the  constitutionality of the Act"); Lewis v. United States,  523 U.S.
155,  160 (1998)  (refusing to enforce  a statute's  conventional meaning when "a  literal reading
of the  words  . . . would  dramatically  separate  the  statute  from  its  intended  purpose").  I
should  also  note  that  the  Court's  approach  to  implied  federal  preemption  of state  law
generally reflects premises  more akin to those evident in its former purposivism.  See Daniel
J. Meltzer,  The Supreme Court's Judicial  Passivity,  2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343, 364-68 (arguing
that  contrary  to  its  default  approach  to  statutory  interpretation,  the  Court  engages  in
significant interpretive lawmaking in implied preemption cases).
115.  See, e.g.,  Cooper  Indus.  v.  Aviall  Servs.,  543  U.S.  157,  167  (2004)  (Thomas,  J.)
("Given the  clear meaning  of the text,  there is no need to  resolve this dispute or to consult
the purpose of CERCLA at all."); Ragsdale  v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.,  535 U.S.  81,  93-
94  (2002)  (Kennedy,  J.)  ("Like  any  key  term  in  an  important  piece  of legislation,  the
[relevant]  figure  was  the  result of compromise  between  groups  with  marked  but divergent
interests in the contested provision ....  Courts and  agencies must respect and give effect  to
these sorts of compromises.");  Artuz v. Bennett,  531  U.S.  4,  10 (2000) (Scalia, J.)  (refusing
to consider various "policy arguments"  while embracing what the Court viewed as "the  only
permissible  interpretation  of the  text-which  may,  for  all  we  know,  have  slighted policy
concerns  on  one  or  the  other side  of the  issue  as  part  of the  legislative  compromise  that
enabled  the  law to  be enacted");  Pa.  Dep't of Corr. v.  Yeskey,  524 U.S.  206,  212  (1998)
(Scalia,  J.)  ("[A]ssuming  . . . that Congress  did not  envisio[n]  that  the  [Americans  with
Disabilities  Act]  would  be  applied to  state  prisoners,  in  the  context  of an  unambiguous
statutory  text  that  is  irrelevant."  (second  alteration  in  original)  (citation  and  internal
quotation  omitted));  Oncale  v.  Sundowner  Offshore  Servs.,  Inc.,  523  U.S.  75,  79  (1998)
(Scalia,  J.)  ("[Sitatutory  prohibitions  often  go beyond the principal  evil to  cover reasonably
comparable  evils,  and  it  is ultimately  the provisions  of our  laws  rather than  the principal
concerns  of our legislators  by which we  are governed.");  Brogan  v. United States,  522 U.S.
398, 403  (1998)  (Scalia,  J.)  (observing  "the  reality  that the reach of a  statute often  exceeds
the precise evil to be eliminated" and explaining that "it is not, and cannot be, our practice to
restrict the unqualified language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress was trying to
remedy--even  assuming that it is possible to identify that evil from something other than the
text  of the  statute  itself');  W.  Va.  Univ.  Hosps.,  Inc.  v.  Casey,  499  U.S.  83,  98  (1991)
(Scalia,  J.) (noting that "the purpose of a statute includes  not only what it sets out to change,
but also  what it resolves  to leave alone,"  and that  "[t]he  best evidence  of that purpose is the
statutory text adopted by both  Houses of Congress  and submitted to  the President"  (citation
omitted)).
116.  See, e.g., Bates v. United States,  522 U.S.  23,  29 (1997)  (Ginsburg, J.) ("The text of
§  1097(a) does not include an 'intent to defraud' state of mind requirement, and we ordinarily
resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face."); Nat'l  Org. for
Women,  Inc.  v. Scheidler, 510 U.S.  249,  262 (1994)  (Rehnquist, C.J.)  ("[T]he fact that [the
Racketeer  Influenced  and  Corrupt  Organizations  Act]  has  been  applied  in  situations  not
expressly  anticipated  by  Congress  does  not  demonstrate  ambiguity.  It  demonstrates
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III.  LESSONS  FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
From the foregoing descriptions  of the  Stevens and  Scalia positions,  one
thing  should  be  quite  clear:  Purposivists  and  textualists  start  from
breadth."  (first alteration  in  original)  (internal  quotation  omitted));  Pension  Benefit  Guar.
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S.  633,  646-47 (1990)  (Blackmun, J.)  (."[N]o  legislation pursues
its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed  to the
achievement  of a  particular  objective  is  the  very  essence  of legislative  choice-and  it
frustrates  rather  than  effectuates  legislative  intent  simplistically  to  assume  that  whatever
furthers  the  statute's  primary  objective  must be  the  law."'  (quoting  Rodriguez  v.  United
States,  480  U.S.  522,  525-26  (1987)));  Hallstrom  v.  Tillamook  County,  493  U.S.  20,  29
(1989)  (O'Connor,  J.)  ("Giving  full  effect  to  the  words  of the  statute  preserves  the
compromise  struck by Congress.");  Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.  Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
748 n.14 (1989)  (Marshall,  J.)  ("Strict adherence to the language  and structure  of the Act is
particularly  appropriate where,  as here, a statute is the result of a series of carefully  crafted
compromises.").  Indeed,  the Court recently made the same point about  state  laws in terms
suggesting that the Court regards  messiness and compromise  as an inescapable  reality of the
legislative  process. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S.  103,  108  (2003)
(noting  that the  state  law  under review,  "like  most  laws,  might  predominately  serve  one
general  objective  ...while  containing  subsidiary  provisions  that  seek  to achieve  other
desirable  (perhaps  even  contrary)  ends  as  well,  thereby  producing  a  law  that  balances
objectives  but still  serves  the  general  objective when  seen as  a whole").  Accordingly,  as
many scholars have noted, the Rehnquist Court's approach to statutory interpretation  became
considerably  more  textually  oriented  than  in  the  past.  See,  e.g.,  Thomas  W.  Merrill,
Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72  Wash. U.  L.Q.  351,  356-63  (1994)
(discussing  the  Rehnquist  Court's  shift  toward  textualism);  Peter  L.  Strauss,  On
Resegregating the  Worlds of Statute and Common  Law,  1994  Sup.  Ct.  Rev.  429,  444-45
(same);  Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,  The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress:
The United  States Supreme Court's Use of  Dictionaries,  47 Buff. L. Rev. 227, 252-60 (1999)
(same).
The influence of textualism  is also evident in the way purposivist Justices now frame their
opinions.  Consider General Dynamics Land  Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581  (2004),  in
which the  Court examined  whether  the Age  Discrimination  in  Employment  Act  of  1967
("ADEA"), Pub. L. No.  90-202,  81  Stat. 603 (codified as amended at  29 U.S.C.  §§  621-634
(2000)), prohibits  discrimination  against  younger  workers  in  favor  of older  ones.  In  his
opinion for the Court,  Justice  Souter-one of the  Court's leading  purposivists-found  that
the  Act's  protections  reach  only  discrimination  against  older  workers  and  in  favor  of
younger workers,  even though  the text unqualifiedly  bans "discriminat[ion]  . . . because  of
[an] individual's  age."  29  U.S.C.  § 623(a)(1);  see also Cline, 540  U.S.  at  585-86.  To  be
sure,  he  relied  centrally  on  the  ADEA's  apparent  purposes,  as  evidenced  by  both  the
legislative history and the enacted  findings of purpose.  See id at 589-93.  But the  important
point is that Justice  Souter felt it necessary  to show that the phrase "age  discrimination" has
come to have a colloquial usage that is capable of  bearing the narrower meaning:
[T]he testimony,  reports, and congressional  findings simply  confirm that Congress
used  the phrase  "discriminat[ion]  ...  because of [an]  individual's age"  the  same
way that ordinary  people in common usage might speak of age  discrimination any
day  of the  week.  One  commonplace  conception  of American  society  in  recent
decades  is  its character  as  a  "youth  culture,"  and  in  a  world  where  younger  is
better, talk about discrimination  because of age is naturally  understood  to refer to
discrimination  against the older.
Id.  at 591.  Accordingly, although he ultimately  rested his opinion on inferences of purpose,
Justice  Souter  felt it necessary  to justify that result  in terms of accepted  understandings  of
the text.  At  one  time  not  too  long  ago,  the  Court might  instead  have  decided  Cline by
holding that the  letter of the  ADEA reached  discrimination  in  both directions,  but  that the
spirit of the statute  confined its intended  reach to discrimination  against  older workers.  That
kind of reasoning is now exceedingly  scarce in the U.S. Reports.
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diametrically  opposed  premises.  Purposivists  (like  Justice  Stevens)
presume that Congress  often enacts  inadvertently  imprecise texts  in pursuit
of coherent  policies.  In  contrast,  textualists  (like  Justice  Scalia)  presume
that  Congress  enacts  rather  precise  texts  but  frequently  sacrifices  policy
coherence as the price of enactment.  Neither presumption rests on anything
like  a  reliable  empirical  judgment  about  why  a  statute  may  have  an
awkward  means/ends  fit  in  any  given  case.  To  be  sure,  textualists
believe-in my view, correctly-that  because all statutes reflect bargaining
among  large  numbers  of actors  representing  quite  diverse  interests  and
views,  all  laws  inevitably  embody  some  measure  of  bargained-for
compromise.  But  it  is  quite  another  thing  to  suggest  that  one  can  tell
whether  statutory awkwardness  in any given case is, in fact, the by-product
of phraseology  that  stemmed  from  a  compromise  essential  to  the  bill's
passage  or,  instead,  the  mere  side  effect  of  legislative  inadvertence  that
could and would  have been corrected had the  specific  statutory  application
come to  the legislators'  attention.  Indeed,  for a textualist (like myself),  an
inescapable  starting  premise  is  that  the  complexity,  opacity,  and  path
dependence of the legislative process  make it difficult, if not impossible,  to
know why a statute took the final shape  it did or, counterfactually, whether
legislators  could  have  successfully  amended  the  statute  to  deal  with  a
troublesome  application had it been  foreseen.  At times,  moreover,  even a
strong purposivist like Justice Stevens has seemed to acknowledge room for
empirical doubt about the reasons  a particular piece of legislation may have
ended up looking as it did. 1 17
Accordingly,  a  'choice  between  the  Stevens  presumption  of  messy
drafting  but  coherent  policy  and  the  Scalia  presumption  of  deliberate
drafting but messy compromise  must rest on a systemic,  normatively rooted
premise  about  which  of  the  two  presumptions  better  describes  the
appropriate judicial understanding  of Congress's  role  in  our constitutional
structure.  Of course  the Constitution  does not explicitly  prescribe  rules  of
statutory  interpretation.  But  because  all  such  interpretation  is  "an
interbranch  encounter  of  sorts," 118  selecting  an  appropriate  interpretive
117.  In his famous opinion  in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural  Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,  467  U.S.  837  (1984),  Justice  Stevens  acknowledged  the mysteries  of the  legislative
drafting process.  In explaining the Court's decision  to equate ambiguity  in an administrative
statute  with a  legislative delegation  of lawmaking power to the agency,  his opinion for  the
Court  offered  the  following  account  of  why  Congress  might  enact  an  open-ended
administrative  statute:
Perhaps  [Congress]  consciously desired the  [agency]  to strike the  [specific policy]
balance ...  thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility
for administering the provision would  be in a  better position to do  so;  perhaps it
simply  did  not  consider  the  question  at  this  level;  and  perhaps  Congress  was
unable  to  forge a  coalition  on either side of the question,  and  those on  each  side
decided  to take their  chances with the scheme devised  by the agency.  For judicial
purposes,  it matters not which of these things occurred.
Id.  at  865.
118.  Jane  S.  Schacter,  Metademocracy:  The  Changing Structure of Legitimacy  in
Statutory Interpretation,  108 Harv. L. Rev. 593,  593  (1995).
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method  involves  inevitable  choices  about  the  institutional  allocation  of
power  between  courts  and  legislatures. 119   To  the  extent  that  our
constitutional  structure  reflects  considered judgments  about that allocation
of power,  rules  of statutory  interpretation  should  be  designed  to  further,
rather  than  detract  from,  the  structural  objectives  established  by  the
constitutional design. 1 20
119.  See  id. at  593-94  ("[S]tatutory  interpretation  represents  the  legal  moment  when  a
court confronts the product of the legislative branch and must assign meaning to a contested
provision.  To carry out its task, the court must adopt-at  least implicitly-a  theory about its
own  role by defining the goal and methodology  of the interpretive  enterprise and by  taking
an  institutional  stance  in relation  to  the  legislature.").  Jerry  Mashaw  has  made  a  similar
point:
Any  theory  of statutory  interpretation  is  at base  a  theory  about  constitutional
law.  It must  at the  very  least  assume  a  set of legitimate institutional  roles  and
legitimate  institutional  procedures  that  inform  interpretation.  Otherwise,
rudimentary  questions,  such  as  whether  a  particular  document  presented  for
interpretation  is  a  statute,  or  whether  the  presentation  of that  document  in  a
particular context calls  for an authoritative interpretation of it, cannot be answered.
Beyond these very basic  questions lie many more that determine ultimately  what it
means  to  speak authoritatively  in  a  legislative  or  in  a  legal-interpretive  voice.
Such  questions  can  be answered only by  reference  to the fundamental  normative
and institutional attributes of the state.
Jerry  Mashaw,  As  If  Republican Interpretation, 97  Yale  L.J.  1685,  1686-87  (1988)
(emphasis omitted).
120.  See,  e.g.,  John  F.  Manning,  Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations  ofAgency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev.  612, 636-37  (1996)  [hereinafter,
Manning,  Structure  and Deference];  John  F.  Manning,  Constitutional Structure  and
Statutory Formalism,  66 U.  Chi. L. Rev.  685, 689-93  (1999).  Before  turning to the relevant
structural  inferences,  it is  necessary to explain  why it is even  permissible  for a textualist to
rely on such inferences.  After all, drawing structural  inferences  entails inferring background
purpose from the text of the Constitution  as  a whole.  After all,  if textualists doubt that one
can  infer purpose from  the complex  legislative process,  one might think it hopeless to try to
derive  purpose  from  the  far  more  complex  process  of adopting  the  Constitution.  That
concern,  however, misapprehends both the  lessons of modem textualism  and what it means
to draw structural inferences  from the Constitution.  Textualists do not deny that a statutory
text, read  in context,  can  convey a purpose.  See, e.g.,  W.  Va.  Univ.  Hosps.,  Inc.  v.  Casey,
499  U.S.  83,  98  (1991)  (Scalia,  J.)  ("The best evidence of...  purpose is the  statutory  text
adopted  by both  Houses  of Congress  and  submitted  to the President.");  see also Manning,
supra note  89, at 2396-98  (discussing  the way texts express intent or purpose).  Nor do they
deny that the  structure of a statutory scheme potentially sheds light on the objectives  sought
to be advanced. See, e.g.,  City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker  Serv.,  Inc., 536 U.S.
424,  450  (2002)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting)  (noting that "[e]vidence  of pre-emptive  purpose is
sought  in  the  text  and  structure  of the  statute  at  issue"  (alteration  in  original)  (emphasis
omitted)  (quoting  CSX  Transp.,  Inc.  v.  Easterwood,  507  U.S.  658,  664  (1993));  United
States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439,  449 (1988)  (Scalia,  J.)  (holding that the non-reviewability  of
adverse  personnel  actions  under the  Civil  Service  Reform  Act  derives  "not  only  from  the
statutory  language,  but  also  from  . . . the  structure  of the  statutory  scheme").  Rather,
textualists  object  to  the courts'  using background  statutory  purpose to  contradict  the clear
semantic  import  of a  specific  statutory  provision.  See, e.g.,  Johnson  v.  United  States,  529
U.S.  694, 723  (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)  ("Our obligation  is to go as  far in achieving the
general congressional  purpose as the text of the statute  fairly prescribes-and no further.");
Mertens  v.  Hewitt  Assocs.,  508  U.S.  248,  261  (1993)  (Scalia,  J.)  ("[V]ague  notions  of a
statute's  'basic  purpose'  are ..  . inadequate  to overcome  the words  of its text  regarding the
specific  issue  under  consideration.").  In  such  cases,  modem  textualists  believe  that
enforcing the purpose rather than the clear text of a statute potentially undermines legislative
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In this part, I suggest two related reasons for thinking that the textualists'
presumption  of  messy  compromise  accords  better  with  background
understandings  of constitutional  law.  First, because  the  Constitution  lays
heavy emphasis on legislative  compromise,  a presumption in favor of clear
semantic  import  of an  enacted  text supplies  a  necessary  means  by which
compromise,  once reached,  can  be  effectively  recorded. 121  Ultimately,  if
courts presume that semantic  meaning,  when  clear, captures  an underlying
(but  unstated)  compromise,  those  who  wish  to  strike  a  compromise  will
possess a reliable way of doing so.  Conversely,  if the Court presumes that
awkward  wording  reflects  inadvertence,  then  it  becomes  difficult  to  see
how  legislators  can  reliably  agree  to  support  legislation  on  the  condition
that its supporters  will accept half a loaf.  Agreed-upon  limits on the reach
of any  statutory rule risk giving way to claims that carrying the statute to its
logical conclusion will effectuate  the legislative will and  correct an obvious
failure  of  legislative  expression.  Second,  a  presumption  of  policy
coherence is also in tension with the highly deferential regime of rationality
review that the Court applies to evaluate ordinary socioeconomic  legislation
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 122  Under the rational
basis  test,  courts  may  not  insist  that  a  statute  be  coherent  with  an
overarching  legislative purpose because  such insistence would intrude upon
the  prerogatives  of  an  often  messy  but  ultimately  democratic  political
process.  I  submit  here  that the  presumption  of coherence  that lies  at the
heart  of  strong  purposivism  achieves  indirectly  through  statutory
compromise.  See, e.g.,  Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,  534 U.S. 438,  461  (2002)  (Thomas, J.)
("Dissatisfied with the text of the statute, the Commissioner attempts to search for and apply
an overarching legislative purpose to each section of the statute.  Dissatisfaction, however, is
often the  cost of legislative  compromise.");  City of Chicago  v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511  U.S.
328, 339 (1994)  (Scalia, J.)  ("It is not unusual for legislation to contain diverse purposes that
must  be  reconciled,  and  the  most  reliable  guide  for  that  task  is  the  enacted  text.").
Conversely,  when  a  specific  statutory  provision  is  silent  or  ambiguous  on  a  critical
interpretive  point,  textualists  readily  consult  a  statute's  overall  purpose  to  resolve  the
question. See, e.g.,  Asgrow  Seed  Co.  v.  Winterboer,  513  U.S.  179,  192  (1995)  (Scalia,  J.)
("While the meaning of the text is by no means clear, this is in our view the only reading that
comports  with  the statutory  purpose  .... ");  Nat'l  Tax Credit  Partners  v. Havlik,  20  F.3d
705,  707 (7th  Cir. 1994)  (Easterbrook,  J.)  ("Knowing the purpose behind a rule  may help a
court  decode  an  ambiguous  text,  but  first  there  must  be  some  ambiguity."  (citations
omitted)).  Using  structural  inferences  to  resolve  the  textually  unspecified  question  of
appropriate  interpretive norms  surely  falls  within the constitutional  tradition of interpreting
open-ended grants of power in light of the constitutional  structure as a whole. See Charles L.
Black, Structure  and Relationship  in Constitutional  Law 3-32 (1969)  (examining  the use of
structural inference in constitutional adjudication);  Henry P. Monaghan,  The Supreme Court,
1974  Term-Foreword. Constitutional Common Law, 89  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1, 13  n.72  (1975)
("[T]he  traditional  method  of 'interpreting'  textual  provisions  is hardly  inconsistent  with
taking  into  account  structural  considerations.  The  former  are  often  simply  the  textual
embodiment  of the latter.").  In such cases, textualists  will consult structural inferences from
the  text  as  a  whole  "not  because  th[e]  precise  accommodative  meaning  is  what  the
lawmakers must have had in mind ....  but because it is [the judiciary's]  role to make sense
rather than nonsense out of the corpusjuris." W.  Va. Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 100-01.
121.  See infra Part III.A.
122.  See infra Part III.B.
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interpretation what the Court has placed  off limits in the context of judicial
review.  In  closing,  I  will  add  a  few  words  about  the  subsidiary  debate
concerning  the  use  of  legislative  history  as  a  source  of evidence  about
statutory meaning.
123
A.  Semantic Meaning and  Legislative Compromise
The textualists'  systemic  presumption that  the  clear  semantic  import  of
the  enacted  text  reflects  compromise  (rather  than  judicial  correctable
legislative  inadvertence)  fits  more  comfortably  within  a  constitutional
structure  that  contemplates  and,  indeed,  places  a  premium on  legislative
compromise. 124  As  I  have  discussed  in  detail  in  previous  writing,125
political  scientists  have  shown  that  by  dividing  the  legislative  process
among  three  institutions  answering  to  distinct  constituencies,  the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article  I, Section  7, in effect
create  a  supermajority  requirement. 126  This  feature,  in  turn,  serves  to
harness  the  influence  of  majoritarian  "factions"  by  assigning  political
minorities  extraordinary  power  to  stop  (or  at  least  slow)  the  passage  of
legislation and, more  important,  to insist upon compromise  as the price  of
their assent. 
127
123.  See infra Part III.C.
124.  The discussion that follows builds upon Manning, supra note 91,  at 103-05.
125.  See Manning, supra note 89, at 2437-38; Manning, supra note 4, at 70-78.
126.  See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 233-48 (1962)
(explaining the way bicameralism  results in supermajority requirements).
127.  Indeed,  by  requiring  equal  representation  of states  in  the  Senate,  the  Constitution
gives quite explicit protection to the political minority consisting  of small-state residents. See
U.S. Const. art. I, § 3; see also id. art.  V (providing that "no State, without its Consent, shall
be deprived of its equal  Suffrage  in the Senate").  For an important discussion of this feature
of  the  Constitution,  see  Bradford  R.  Clark,  Separation of Powers as  a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79  Tex.  L.  Rev.  1321,  1371-72  (2001).  This  emphasis  is  reinforced  by
important  rules of legislative procedure adopted by each House.  U.S.  Const.  art. I, § 5, cl. 2
("Each House may  determine the Rules of its Proceedings.").  By erecting  many and diverse
veto  gates,  the design of the legislative process betrays  a definite  bias in favor of the status
quo,  making  it  hard  for  the  majority  to  translate  its  policy  impulses  seamlessly  into
legislation.  See  Manning,  supra note  89,  at  2390  ("[L]egislative  preferences  do  not  pass
unfiltered  into  legislation;  they  are  distilled  through  a  carefully  designed  process  that
requires  legislation to clear several  distinct institutions, numerous veto gates, the threat of a
Senate  filibuster,  and  countless  other  procedural  devices  that  temper  unchecked
majoritarianism.").  Some legislative procedures-most  notably,  Senate rules concerning  the
filibuster and requirements  of unanimous  consent-quite obviously  seek to protect minority
interests. See, e.g.,  Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry  R. Weingast, The Institutional  Foundations
of Committee Power,  81  Am.  Pol. Sci. Rev.  85, 89  (1987)  ("A small group of senators in the
U.S.  Senate may engage in filibuster and other forms of obstruction.  Any  individual senator
may refuse  unanimous  consent to  procedures  that would  expedite  passage  of a  committee
bill.  In  short,  veto groups  are pervasive  in legislatures  .... ").  Other procedures-such  as
the  requirement  of committee  approval-are  somewhat  more  ambiguous,  but  potentially
have a  similar effect.  Although political  scientists debate  the  question rather  vigorously,  a
good  deal  of evidence  supports  the  view  that  many  standing  committees  are  imperfectly
representative of the chamber from which they are drawn.  See, e.g.,  John R.  Boyce & Diane
P. Bischak, The Role of  Political Parties in the Organization of Congress, 18 J.L. Econ.  &
Org.  1, 2-3  (2002) (summarizing the debate).  The conclusions drawn here do not depend  on
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Judicial adherence  to clear semantic meaning is crucial to effectuating the
compromises  that the constitutional  structure produces.  Semantic  meaning
uniquely  affords  legislators  a  means  to  express  the  level  of generality  at
which  they wish  to  articulate  the policies  to  which  they have  agreed.  As
discussed,  legislators may wish to accept half a loaf.  Or they may agree  to
forgo  costly and disruptive  bargaining over desired exceptions  to otherwise
broadly framed statutory terms. 128  Semantic  meaning provides  the most, if
not the  only,  reliable  means  by which  legislators  can  express  the  relevant
limits  on how far they are willing to  go.  If interpreters  hew closely to the
way  a  reasonable  person  would  understand  language  in  context,  then
legislative  drafters  can  convey  policy  impulses  with  greater  or  lesser
degrees of specificity.  Conversely, if one were to give background  purpose
priority over semantic detail, then it would be quite difficult to fathom how
a legislator with the power to exact a compromise could bargain reliably for
any particular outcome.
None of the foregoing  analysis  is meant  to  deny that statutory  wording
may,  at  times,  reflect  the  random,  mistaken,  or  shortsighted  act  of  a
legislative drafter.  But the important point is that if a sentient actor with the
power to insist  upon compromise  wishes  to  agree  to  legislation  based  on
limiting  conditions,  he  or  she must  reach  an  agreement  that records  those
limitations  in  semantic  expression  that  the  relevant  linguistic  community
understands.' 29  If, however,  courts are  free to abstract  from such wording
to  the  statute's  apparent  background  purposes  even  when  the  semantic
import is clear from context, then it becomes difficult to see how legislators
bent  on  framing  their policies  in broader  or  narrower  terms  can  reliably
effectuate  that  goal.  Professor  Max  Radin wrote  that  seeking  a  statute's
"ultimate"  purpose  is  an  unreliable  approach  to  statutory  interpretation
because "nearly every  end is a means  to another end,"  and the purpose of a
statute  can  therefore  reasonably  be  described  at  many  levels  of
generality. 130  If, as  Justice  Scalia  has  suggested,  "[t]he  final  form  of a
whether such committees  are representative.  Accordingly,  I leave  that complex question to
one side for purposes of this Essay.
128.  See Manning,  supra note 89,  at 2424-29  (discussing  the process  of bargaining  over
exceptions).
129.  Certainly, in cases in which wording reflects happenstance, there will be social costs
associated  with  enforcing  the  directive  as  written  rather  than  adjusting  it  to  reflect  more
accurately  the  apparent  legislative  aims.  But  given  the  previously  discussed  difficulties
associated with  reconstructing  the  outcomes of a  complex  legislative process,  the opposite
strategy-sacrificing  semantic integrity  for policy coherence-would  avoid that cost only by
undermining  the  effective  capacity  to  reduce policy  impulses  to reliable compromises.  To
strike  that  balance  would  reflect  an  odd  understanding  of  the  concept  of  legislative
supremacy,  given  the central  place that legislative  compromise occupies  in the  design both
of bicameralism  and  presentment  and  of  legislatively  adopted  rules  that,  if  anything,
accentuate the impulses for compromise embodied in the constitutional process.
130.  Max  Radin,  Statutory Interpretation, 43  Harv.  L.  Rev.  856,  876  (1930).  Judge
Stephen Williams made a similar point:
Notice  that  as  soon  as  the  analysis  of purpose  is  divorced  from  the  means
selected, all limits are off.  Every purpose can always be restated at a higher level
of generality.  We  can  go  straight  from  protecting  consumers  to  the  ultimate
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statute  . . . is  often  the  result  of a  compromise  among  various  interest
groups,  resulting  in  a  decision  to  go  so  far  and  no  farther,"'131  then
legislators  with  the  authority  to  exact  a compromise  must  be  able  to  use
words to specify just how far that decision has gone.
B.  Rationality  Review and  Statutory Coherence
The premises underlying  rationality review also support the presumption
that  awkward  legislation  reflects  untidy  compromise  rather  than  coherent
but poorly drafted policy making.  The Court applies the highly deferential
rational-basis test when it reviews ordinary legislation (that which  does not
contain  invidious classifications  or touch on  fundamental  rights)  under the
Due Process  and Equal  Protection Clauses. 132  The rational-basis  case  law
makes clear that in such cases  the Court's task is to accept legislation if any
conceivable  rational  basis  supports  it.  This  highly  deferential  standard
acknowledges  that laws may be over- or under-inclusive  in relation to their
background  justifications.  In the  context  of this  case  law,  the  Court  has
made clear  that  it will  not  insist upon  coherent  expressions  of policy but
will  accept  as  constitutionally  permissible  the  kind  of  imperfect
classifications,  rough  accommodations,  and uneven  compromises  that  the
legislative process  routinely produces.133  This highly  deferential  standard,
moreover,  consciously embodies  a doctrine  of judicial  restraint-a way  to
ensure that judges do not  intrude upon the prerogatives  of the duly  elected
political  branches.  The  rationality  cases  direct  courts  to  bend  over
backwards  to  respect imperfect  legislation,  so  that judges  do not substitute
weapon--enhancing  human  dignity.  Once you're  enhancing  human  dignity,  the
range of policy choices is limitless.
Stephen  F.  Williams,  Rule and Purpose in Legal Interpretation,  61  U.  Colo.  L.  Rev.  809,
811  (1990).
131.  E.  Assoc.  Coal  Corp.  v.  United Mine  Workers  of Am.,  531  U.S.  57, 68-69  (2000)
(Scalia,  J., concurring in the judgment); see also, e.g.,  Hrubec v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger  Corp.,
49 F.3d  1269,  1270  (7th Cir.  1995)  (Easterbrook,  J.)  ("Many laws  are compromises,  going
thus  far and no further  in pursuit of a goal.");  Heath  v. Varity  Corp.,  71  F.3d 256,  258 (7th
Cir.  1995)  (Easterbrook,  J.)  ("Legislation  reflects  compromise  among  competing  interests
....  It  upsets  the  legislative  balance  to  push  the  outcome  farther  in  either  direction.");
Easterbrook, supra note 102,  at 63 ("[L]aw  is like a vector.  It has length as well as direction.
We must find both, or we  know nothing of value.  To find length  we must take account  of
objectives,  of means  chosen,  and  of stopping  places  identified.");  Easterbrook,  Foreword,
supra  note  105,  at 46 ("If legislation grows out of compromises among  special interests,  ...
a  court cannot add  enforcement  to get more  of what  Congress wanted ....  When  a court
observes that Congress  propelled Group X part way to its desired end, it cannot assist Group
X farther along the journey without undoing the structure of the deal.").
132.  The analysis of rationality review draws upon Manning, supra  note 89, at 2446-54.
133.  See,  e.g.,  U.S.  R.R.  Ret.  Bd.  v. Fritz,  449  U.S.  166,  175  (1980)  ("[T]he  Court in
cases involving  social and economic  benefits  has consistently refused to invalidate on equal
protection grounds  legislation which it simply  deemed.  . . unartfully drawn.");  Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,  611 (1960)  ("[I]t is not within our authority to determine whether  the
Congressional  judgment  ...  is  sound  or equitable .... "); Williamson  v.  Lee  Optical  Co.,
348  U.S.  483,  488  (1955)  (noting  that courts  lack  authority  to  displace  legislation  simply
because  they think  it "unwise,  improvident,  or out of harmony  with  a particular  school  of
thought").
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their judgment for that of the (unruly)  democratic process.  In other words,
were  the courts to insist that legislation be coherent with some overarching
purpose,  whether  actual  or  hypothesized,  then  judicial  review  would
displace  a  great  deal  of legislative  policy making.  I argue  here  that the
presumption of legislative coherence imposed by strong purposivism allows
federal  courts  to  achieve  indirectly what  the  Court has  forbidden  them to
accomplish directly through judicial review.
Although  the Court's  decisions  have varied  somewhat  in their approach
to  rationality  review, 134  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the  dominant  theme  of the
Court's post-New  Deal  cases has been one of exceptional  deference toward
ordinary  legislation-whether state or federal and whether challenged  under
due  process  or equal  protection  principles.  The Court attaches  a powerful
presumption  of  validity  to  statutes  that  do  not  employ  suspect
classifications  or  affect  fundamental  rights.135  In  such  cases,  the  Court
(with  rare  exception)  has  refused  to  consider  the  legitimacy  of legislative
ends. 136  More  important  for present purposes,  the Court has  also rejected
the requirement of a substantial means-ends fit. 1 3 7
The  process assumptions  underlying  rationality  review are  instructive in
deciding  whether to  embrace  the purposivists'  presumption  that legislation
is  (a)  ultimately coherent with an overarching  background  purpose  and  (b)
ripe for judicial adjustment if the clear import of the text fails to capture the
presumed standard of coherence.  First, the rational-basis  case law explicitly
presupposes  that  a  well-functioning  legislative  process  will  produce
imperfect,  if not odd, statutes as a matter of course  (rather than as  a matter
of  imprecise  drafting).  The  Court  has  thus  emphasized  that  "'[t]he
problems  of government  are  practical  ones and  may justify, if they do not
require, rough  accommodations-illogical,  it may be, and unscientific." '13 8
134,  See Fritz, 449  U.S.  at  176  n. 10 (emphasizing that "[t]he most arrogant  legal scholar
would  not  claim  that all  of [the  Court's]  cases  applied  a  uniform  or consistent  test"  of
rationality); see also Cent.  State Univ. v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors,  526  U.S.  124,  132
(1999)  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)  ("Cases applying the  rational-basis  test  have described  that
standard in various ways.").
135.  See,  e.g.,  Hodel  v.  Indiana,  452  U.S.  314,  331-32  (1981)  (stating  that  "such
legislation  carries  with it a presumption  of rationality  that can  only be overcome  by a clear
showing of arbitrariness  and irrationality");  Lehnhausen  v. Lake  Shore Auto Parts  Co.,  410
U.S.  356,  364  (1973)  ("'The  burden  is on  the  one attacking  the  legislative  arrangement  to
negative  every conceivable  basis  which  might support  it."'  (quoting  Madden  v. Kentucky,
309 U.S. 83,  88 (1940))).
136.  See Henry  P. Monaghan,  Marbury and the Administrative State, 83  Colum.  L. Rev.
1,  34  (1983)  (noting  that  rationality  review  provides,  "as  a  matter  of  constitutional
interpretation, that the political branches are empowered to achieve a broad range of goals").
137.  Cass R.  Sunstein, Naked Preferences  and the Constitution, 84  Colum. L. Rev.  1689,
1697-98  (1984)  ("Modem rationality  review is  also  characterized  by extremely  deferential
means-ends  scrutiny.  The Supreme  Court demands only  the weakest  link between  a public
value and the measure in question, and it is sometimes willing to hypothesize  legitimate ends
not realistically attributable to the enacting legislature.").
138.  Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485  (1970)  (quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v.
City of Chicago, 228  U.S.  61,  69-70 (1913));  see also, e.g.,  City of Dallas v.  Stanglin, 490
U.S.  19, 27  (1989);  Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,  108 n.26 (1979).
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Further, the legislative  process "often  involves tradeoffs,  compromises, and
imperfect  solutions." 139  Legislation, in other words, will not always reflect
a coherent expression of public policy.
Second, modem rationality review  insists that the judiciary respect these
"imperfect"  legislative  outcomes. 140  The rationality  cases, moreover,  rest
on  a conscious judgment  about the  appropriate  limits on judicial  power in
our system of government-or, more  accurately,  the appropriate  line to  be
drawn between judicial and legislative power in that system.  The judiciary
lacks  "'authority  to  determine  whether  [a]  Congressional  judgment  .. .is
sound  or equitable,  or whether it comports well or  ill with purposes  of the
Act.""'141  Rather,  in  cases  of routine  legislation,  the judiciary  "properly
exercises  only  a  limited  review  power  over  Congress,  the  appropriate
representative  body  through  which  the  public  makes  democratic  choices
among alternative  solutions to social  and economic problems."1 42  In other
words, rationality review "is a paradigm of judicial restraint." 143
Accordingly,  the judiciary  must  sustain  ordinary  legislation  "if there  is
any reasonably  conceivable  state of facts that could provide a rational  basis
for the classification."' 144  If the Court can  identify  "plausible  reasons"  for
Congress's  action,  judicial  "inquiry  is  at  an  end." 145  And  it  is  "entirely
139.  Preseault v.  Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S.  1, 19 (1990).
140.  In  this  sense,  the  modem  cases  admirably  reflect  the  premises  of Justice  Oliver
Wendell Holmes's famous dissent  in Lochner v. New York,  198  U.S. 45 (1905),  in which he
wrote that "[the  Constitution]  is  made for people  of fundamentally differing views,  and the
accident  of our  finding  certain  opinions  natural  and  familiar  or  novel  and  even  shocking
ought not  to  conclude  our judgment  upon  the  question  whether  statutes  embodying  them
conflict  with  the  Constitution  of the  United  States."  Id.  at  76  (Holmes,  J.,  dissenting).
Justice  Hugo  Black's  majority  opinion  in  Ferguson v.  Skrupa,  372  U.S.  726  (1963),
describes the Court's shift to Holmes's position:
There  was a time when  the  Due Process  Clause  was  used by this  Court to  strike
down laws which were thought unreasonable,  that is, unwise or incompatible with
some particular economic  or social philosophy....
The  doctrine  that  prevailed  in .. .[such]  cases-that  due process  authorizes
courts  to  hold  laws  unconstitutional  when they  believe  the  legislature has  acted
unwisely-has long since been discarded.
Id.  at 729-30.  For an excellent summary of the consolidation  of the Court's post-New  Deal
framework,  see  Robert A. McCloskey,  Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 34, 38.
141.  U.S.  R.R.  Ret.  Bd.  v.  Fritz,  449  U.S.  166,  175-76  (1980)  (quoting  Flemming  v.
Nestor,  363 U.S.  603,  611  (1960));  see, e.g.,  Hodel, 452 U.S.  at 333  (noting that a  federal
court  "exceed[s]  its  proper  role"  if  it  passes  on  the  wisdom  of legislation);  City  of New
Orleans  v.  Dukes,  427  U.S.  297,  303  (1976)  (stating  that federal  courts  lack  authority  to
"judge  the  wisdom  or desirability  of legislative  policy  determinations  made  in areas  that
neither affect  fundamental  rights  nor proceed  along  suspect  lines"); Ferguson, 372  U.S. at
730  (endorsing  the  proposition  "that  courts  do  not  substitute  their  social  and  economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies,  who are elected to pass laws").
142.  Schweiker  v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,230 (1981).
143.  FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.,  508 U.S. 307, 314  (1993).
144.  Id.  at  313; see  also, e.g.,  Sullivan  v. Stroop,  496 U.S.  478,  485  (1990);  Bowen  v.
Gilliard,  483  U.S. 587,  600-03  (1987);  Fritz, 449  U.S.  at  174-79;  Dandridge  v.  Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970).
145.  Fritz, 449 U.S.  at 179.
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irrelevant  for constitutional purposes  whether the  conceived  [rational basis]
• . . actually  motivated the  legislature."146  This  focus  on  outcome,  rather
than intent, follows  from the Court's acceptance  of the imperfections  of the
legislative process.  If legislation often represents a rough compromise, then
measuring  it  against  "actual"  legislative  purpose  risks  attributing
unwarranted  coherence  to  a  process  that  "may  entail  logrolling  or  other
strategic  voting,  making  concessions  to strongly  felt but outlying  interests,
or papering  over disagreements  to ensure the  legislation's passage."'1 47  To
respect  an  inherently  unruly  legislative  process,  judges  applying  the
rational-basis  test  must  focus  only  on  the  rationality  of  the  legislative
outcomes,  not  on whether  those  outcomes  further  some  actual  legislative
purpose. 1
48
The strong purposivism employed  by Justice  Stevens to interpret statutes
starts  from  quite  different  presumptions.  If  a  statutory  classification,
although  clearly  expressed,  contradicts  the  apparent  purpose  that  can  be
pieced  together  from  contextual  evidence,  then judges  are  warranted  in
revising the clear statute  on the assumption that Congress would have  done
so itself had the problem come  to  its attention.  If the complexity,  opacity,
and  path  dependence  of the  legislative  process  make  such  a  conclusion
impossible  to  substantiate  empirically  in  any  given  case,  then  Justice
Stevens's  approach,  in  effect,  authorizes  judges  to  displace  clearly
expressed  statutory  commands  through  interpretation  (rather  than judicial
review)  based  on  a  systemic  legal  (rather  than  factual)  presumption  of
legislative  coherence.  That  presumption,  however,  itself  contradicts  the
clear message of the rationality  cases:  Legislatures sometimes, if not often,
draw awkward  lines of compromise, but those outcomes  nonetheless  merit
judicial  respect  in  our  system  of  constitutional  democracy.  Because
drawing  lines  of  statutory  inclusion  and  exclusion  is  "peculiarly  a
legislative  task"  for  which  "'[p]erfection  . . . is  neither  possible  nor
146.  Beach Commc'ns, 508  U.S. at 315; see also, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S.  1, 15
(1992)  (holding that "rational-basis  review" does not require  "that a legislature or governing
decisionmaker  actually  articulate  at  any  time  the  purpose  or  rationale  supporting  its
classification");  Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179  (noting that it is  'constitutionally  irrelevant whether
[the proffered  rational  basis]  in fact  underlay the  legislative  decision"'  (quoting Flemming,
363 U.S. at 612)).
147.  Manning, supra note 89, at 2450.
148.  In Fritz, the Court rejected the argument  that a statutory classification  was irrational
because  "Congress  was unaware  of what it  accomplished or  ...  was misled by  the groups
that appeared before it." Fritz,  449 U.S.  at 179.  The Court emphasized as follows:
If this test were applied literally to every member of any legislature that ever voted
on a law, there would be very  few laws  which would survive  it.  The  language of
the statute  is clear, and we have historically  assumed that Congress intended  what
it enacted.  To be  sure,  [the  party challenging  the statute]  lost a political battle  in
which he had a strong interest, but this is neither the first nor the last time that such
a result will occur in the legislative forum.
Id.; see  also Vance  v.  Bradley,  440  U.S.  93,  109  (1979)  (stating  that  it  is  "irrelevant"
whether  the  Court  believes  that  "Congress  was  unwise  in  not  choosing  a  means  more
precisely related to its primary purpose").
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necessary, "'149  a court must give effect to a rational classification  even if it
is "to  some extent both underinclusive  and overinclusive"  in relation  to its
apparent  purpose.' 50  Judges  who  practice  strong  purposivism  rely  on
statutory  interpretation  to  achieve  indirectly  what  the  rationality  case  law
prevents  them  from  achieving  directly  through judicial  review-namely,
correcting  problems  of  means/ends  fit  that  the  rational-basis  test  self-
consciously  instructs  judges  to  accept  as  part  of  the  messy  reality  of
legislative governance. 151
C.  A Brief  Note on Legislative History
A purposivist  such as Justice  Stevens might suggest that if textualists  are
ultimately  concerned  with preserving  legislative  compromise,  they  should
not hesitate  to  seek  evidence  of its terms  in  the  legislative  history,  which
after all records the internal deliberations  leading to enactment.  And it does
not  suffice  to  respond,  as  textualists  often  do,  that  legislators  (and  the
lobbyists who seek to influence  them)  now salt the  legislative history with
statements that are expressly  calculated to influence judges-a phenomenon
that  presumably  makes  such  "history"  an  unreliable  record  of  genuine
legislative  understanding  or deliberation. 152  The textualists'  position  is  at
149.  Schweiker  v.  Wilson,  450  U.S.  221,  234  (1981)  (quoting  Mass.  Bd.  of Ret.  v.
Murgia,  427  U.S.  307,  314  (1976)).  Indeed,  such  line-drawing  "'inevitably  requires  that
some  persons who  have an  almost equally  strong  claim  to favored  treatment  be  placed  on
different  sides  of the  line,  and the fact  [that]  the  line might have been  drawn  differently  at
some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration."'  Fritz,  449  U.S. at
179  (citation omitted) (quoting Mathews  v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1976)).
150.  Vance, 440 U.S. at  108.
151.  One might  argue  that strong purposivism  does not contradict  the rational-basis  case
law because the former  involves statutory interpretation  rather than judicial review.  But it is
unclear  whether  aggressive  interpretation,  in  fact, poses  any  less of a  risk  of institutional
intrusion by  the judiciary upon the  legislative  process.  Professor  Mashaw  has  shown  that
misconstruction  of a statute  intrudes  more obviously  on  legislative  prerogatives  than does
striking  down  an  unconstitutional  statute.  See  Jerry  L.  Mashaw,  Greed,  Chaos,  and
Governance:  Using  Public  Choice  to  Improve  Public  Law  105  (1997).  If  the  Court
displaces  a  legislative classification  by  invalidating  a statute,  that action  returns matters  to
the pre-statute  status quo.  The legislature may  reenact a similar policy, since the process of
reenactment  requires  bargaining  among  the  three  actors  (the  House,  the  Senate,  and  the
President)  who passed  the original bill. See  id.  If the  Court instead  alters  a  statutory  text
through  interpretation, that result will stick if any of the three actors  prefers  it to the  likely
corrective legislation. See id.  at  102-03.
152.  See, e.g., United  States v. Taylor, 487  U.S.  326, 345 (1988)  (Scalia,  J., concurring in
the judgment)  (suggesting  that  the  entrenched  practice  of judicial  reliance  on  legislative
history  had  produced  a  "legal  culture"  in  which  a  legislator  might  simply  offer  strategic
legislative  history  in  place of a  statutory amendment);  Int'l  Bhd. of Elec.  Workers,  Local
Union  No.  474  v.  NLRB,  814  F.2d  697,  717  (D.C.  Cir.  1987)  (Buckley,  J.,  concurring)
("[T]o the degree that judges are perceived as  grasping at any fragment of legislative history
for insights  into congressional  intent, to that degree will legislators be encouraged to salt the
legislative  record with  unilateral  interpretations of statutory  provisions they were  unable to
persuade  their  colleagues  to  accept.");  Note,  Why  Learned Hand  Would Never  Consult
Legislative History  Today,  105  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1005,  1015-19  (1992)  (contending  that
legislative  knowledge  of the interpretive authority  of legislative history  necessarily  corrupts
the legislative  record with strategic statements calculated to influence judges).
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least  open  to  empirical  debate.  Recent  political  science  scholarship,  for
example,  suggests  that  those  actors  who  produce  (what  courts  have  long
regarded  as)  the  most  authoritative  legislative  history-committee  reports
and  sponsors'  statements-speak  as  agents  of the  legislative  majority. 153
On  this  assumption,  because  legislators  are repeat  players,  if a committee
chair  or  sponsor  does  not  accurately  describe  the  aims  of  the  enacting
coalition, he or she "can  be subject  to sanctions and loss of reputation."'154
More generally, thoughtful analysts of the legislature have argued  that even
if legislators now strategically  shape legislative history to flesh out statutory
details,  the  contents  of  such  history  nonetheless  reflect  the  product  of
legislative negotiation  and, for that reason, lend insight into the underlying
compromise. 1
55
In prior writing,  I  have extensively  discussed  the problem  of legislative
history. 156   Although  I  will  not  rehearse  that  analysis  here,  brief
consideration  of  the  legislative  history  problem  is  warranted  for
completeness.  The  foregoing  observations  about  the  production  of
legislative  history  do  not  suffice  to  overcome  structural  or  practical
concerns  about  the  legitimacy  of  such  material  as  an  interpretive  tool,
particularly when courts rely on it to overcome  the clear semantic import of
the  statutory  text.  First,  if courts  rely  on  legislative  history  because  it
represents  an  authoritative  (if not enacted)  articulation  of policy  detail  by
designated agents of the majority (a form of non-text text, as  it were),157 the
rationale  for that practice  would contradict  deeply  ingrained  constitutional
norms  against  self-delegation. 158   Well-settled  constitutional  precedents
afford  Congress  wide  latitude  to  delegate  law-elaboration  authority to the
153.  Professors  Matthew  D.  McCubbins,  Robert  Noll,  and  Barry R.  Weingast  (who
publish  collectively  under  the  name McNollgast)  contend that  committee chairs  and floor
managers  explain  legislative  intent  or  purpose  as  "appointed  agent[s]  of the  legislative
majority  that passed the chamber's  version  of the  statute."  McNollgast,  Legislative Intent:
The  Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation,  Law &  Contemp. Probs.,
Winter  1994, at 3, 24.
154.  Id.
155.  See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of  Legislative  History in Interpreting  Statutes,
65  S.  Cal.  L.  Rev.  845,  858-59  (1992)  (arguing  that  in striking  compromises,  legislators,
their  staffs,  and  other participants  in  the  legislative  process  negotiate  about  not only  the
statutory  text,  but also the  content  of legislative  reports  and  floor  statements);  Daniel  B.
Rodriguez  & Barry  R. Weingast,  The Positive Political Theory of  Legislative History: New
Perspectives  on the  1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation,  151  U. Pa. L.  Rev.  1417,
1432  (2003)  ("Statutes-including  both  the  text  of the  enacted  law  and  the  legislative
'history'  encoded  into  the  public  record  of  the  statute-reflect  not  only  legislative
specialization  and expertise, but the vitally important object of trade and negotiation.").
156.  See John F. Manning,  Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum.  L. Rev.
673 (1997).
157.  For  a  particularly  thoughtful  defense  of legislative  history  as  an  extension  of the
adopted text, see Jonathan  R. Siegel, The Use of  Legislative History in a System of  Separated
Powers,  53 Vand. L. Rev.  1457 (2000).
158.  The  discussion  that  follows  builds  on  Manning,  supra  note  156,  at  706-25
(discussing  the  norm  against  self-delegation  and  its  applicability  to  judicial  reliance  on
legislative history as an authoritative source of meaning).
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coordinate  branches, 159 but not  to its own  agents or members. 16 0  In other
words,  Congress  has  the  choice  of "formulat[ing]  the  details"  of statutory
policy itself or "assign[ing]  to the Executive  Branch the responsibility"  for
doing so; it may not assign that authority to those under its direct control.  161
The justification for drawing such a line is straightforward.  If Congress can
delegate  law-elaboration  authority  only  to  the  coordinate  branches,  its
choice  to  do so  incurs the  structurally induced  cost of ceding control over
policy  detail  to  its  constitutional  rivals. 162  If,  however,  Congress  can
delegate  the  formulation  of statutory  detail  to  its  agents  under  its  direct
control,  that  important  structural  disincentive  against  delegation  is
compromised.  Indeed,  Justice  Stevens  has  acknowledged  as  much  (in  a
context other than the use of legislative history):
If Congress  were  free to delegate  its policymaking authority  to one of its
components,  or  to  one  of  its  agents,  it  would  be  able  to  evade  "the
carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution."  That danger-
congressional  action that evades constitutional  restraints  [of bicameralism
and  presentment]-is  not  present  when  Congress  delegates  lawmaking
power to the executive or to an independent agency. 
163
This  constitutional  understanding,  I  believe,  makes  it  quite  difficult  to
justify  legislative history  as  an authoritative  (but unenacted)  elaboration  of
statutory  detail by  agents  empowered by  the  legislative  majority  to act  on
its behalf.
164
159.  The  Court  has  repeatedly  sustained  broad  delegations  of  law-elaboration  to
administrative  agencies. See, e.g.,  Whitman  v. Am. Trucking  Ass'ns, 531  U.S.  457, 474-75
(2001)  ("[W]e  have  'almost  never  felt  qualified  to second-guess  Congress  regarding  the
permissible  degree  of policy judgment  that  can  be  left to  those executing  or  applying  the
law."'  (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.  361,  416 (1989)  (Scalia, J.,  dissenting)));
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S.  742, 785-86 (1948)  (upholding a delegation authorizing  an
administrative  agency  to recoup  "excessive  profits"  on war contracts);  Am.  Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S.  90, 105  (1946)  (holding that the Securities and Exchange Commission
may reject corporate  reorganizations  that are not fair and  equitable); NBC v.  United States,
319  U.S.  190,  226-27  (1943)  (sustaining  the  Federal  Communication  Commission's
delegated authority to allocate broadcasting  licenses  in "the public interest, convenience,  and
necessity").
160.  See  Metro.  Wash.  Airports Auth.  v.  Citizens  for  the  Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc.  (MWAA),  501  U.S. 252,  274-75  (1991)  (individual Members  of Congress may not serve
on  tribunals  exercising  delegated  power);  Bowsher  v.  Synar, 478  U.S.  714,  726-27  (1986)
(Congress  may  not  reserve  power  to  remove  an  officer  exercising  delegated  lawmaking
authority);  INS  v.  Chadha,  462  U.S.  919,  944-59  (1983)  (one-House  legislative  veto  is
unconstitutional).
161.  MWAA,  501 U.S.  at 272.
162.  One  can  find early  recognition  of this structural  insight in  the works of influential
theorists such as Montesquieu  and Blackstone. See Manning, Structure and Deference, supra
note 120, at 647-48 (discussing their separation of  powers  theories).
163.  Bowsher, 478  U.S.  at  755  (Stevens,  J.,  concurring)  (footnote  omitted)  (quoting
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959).
164.  Professor  Jonathan Siegel  has argued that  if legislative history  is  available prior  to
the  final  vote  in both  houses, prevailing  interpretive conventions  (at least, those  prevailing
prior to the advent of textualism) have  made it clear that voting  for the bill is  tantamount to
voting for the authoritative  forms of legislative history that accompanied the bill. See Siegel,
supra note 157,  at  1489-1505.  As  I have argued  elsewhere, that argument does not mitigate
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Second,  even  if (in  contrast  with  textualists)  one  considered  legislative
history  as a potentially reliable source of evidence about what compromises
legislators actually  struck  during the legislative  process, 165 it is difficult to
see  why  such  history  reflects  more  reliable  evidence  of  the  ultimate
compromise  than  would  the  clear  import of the  adopted  text.  The  most
authoritative forms  of legislative history-committee  reports  and sponsors'
statements-are  themselves  a  form  of semantic  expression.  Moreover,
where  such materials squarely  address a difficult  interpretive question that
later  comes  before  the  courts,  it necessarily  follows  that  someone  in  the
legislative  process  has  identified  that  issue  before  the  statute's  final
adoption.166  If the  legislative  history  includes  a  policy  formulation  that
contradicts  the  clear  import  of the  adopted  text,  that  fact  suggests,  if
anything, that the alternative formulation could not have survived the rigors
of  the  legislative  process. 167   In  other  words,  if  different  lines  of
compromise  are  suggested  by  the  enacted  text  and  by  the  unenacted
materials,  it is hard to justify  giving precedence  to the latter rather than the
former.  ' 68
concerns about self-delegation.  See John F.  Manning, Putting  Legislative  History to a Vote:
A  Response to Professor Siegel, 53  Vand.  L.  Rev.  1529  (2000).  Rather,  as  explained  in
greater  detail  below,  there is  little reason to  suppose  that legislators  would  place  a needed
clarification  in the  legislative  history  rather  than  the text  unless it  was more  politically  or
procedurally  costly to  resort  to the  latter.  Accordingly,  from the  standpoint of legislators,
one cannot easily claim that recording "compromises"  in the legislative history  is equivalent
to  recording  them  in  the  statute.  If  legislators  rely  on  extra-statutory  utterances  by
committee chairs or sponsors because it is less politically or procedurally  costly to do so, it is
inaccurate as  a matter of process to equate the statements made by such  agents with the texts
that have  survived  bicameral  passage and  presentment to  the President.  See id. at  1538-40
(suggesting reasons why Professor Siegel's proposal does not allay concerns about the use of
legislative history to circumvent bicameralism and presentment).
165.  See, e.g., James  M. Landis,  A Note on  "Statutory Interpretation,  " 43 Harv.  L. Rev.
886,  888  (1930)  ("The  records  of legislative  assemblies  once  opened  and  read  with  a
knowledge  of legislative procedure often reveal the richest kind of evidence.").
166.  See Manning, supra  note  156, at 728.
167.  See,  e.g.,  Manning,  supra note  89,  at  2424-31  (offering  examples  of legislative
history  that  may  have  declared  intentions  that  differed  from the  enactable  preferences  of
Congress  as  a  whole);  Vermeule,  supra note  13,  at  1841-51  (arguing  that  Congress  was
unable  to make alterations  to the  Alien Contract Labor Act  that the  legislative  history  had
equated with the meaning of  the Act).
168.  Consider an  example  discussed by  then-Judge  Stephen G.  Breyer in his  influential
Roth  Lectures at  the University of Southern  California. See Breyer, supra  note  155,  at 850-
51.  In United  States v. Falvey, 676 F.2d 871  (1st Cir. 1982), the court of appeals construed a
federal statute  imposing  criminal  penalties  upon  any person who  "possesses  ...  any  false,
forged, or counterfeit coin...  with intent to defraud ...  any person."  18  U.S.C. § 485,  para.
2 (1982).  In particular, the court confronted the question whether that provision applies to a
coin  that is not used  as  currency within  the United States, such  as the  gold coin of another
country  purchased  as  an  investment.  The  possession  provision did  not itself include  any
element  requiring that the counterfeit coin be United States currency.  But another paragraph
of the  same  statute  imposes  criminal  sanctions  on  anyone  who  "falsely  makes  . . . any
coin..,  in resemblance  or similitude of any foreign gold  or silver coin current in the United
States or in actual use and circulation  as money within  the United States." Id. § 485,  para. 1.
As  discussed,  see  supra  text  accompanying  notes  46,  66-67,  a  standard  interpretive
presumption  is that when "'Congress  includes particular language  in one section of a statute
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CONCLUSION
At present, Justice Stevens  is the only member of the Supreme Court who
openly  subscribes  to  the  strong  form  of purposivism  associated  with  the
Court's landmark decision  in Holy Trinity.  He sees the legislative  process
as more  than rational  (in  the  constitutional  sense);  he  sees  it  as  a  process
likely to produce  quite  reasonable  and coherent  outcomes  when  measured
against the apparent purposes sought to be achieved and the common sense
of  humankind.  When  the  enacted  text  falls  sufficiently  short  of  that
expectation,  he  frequently  assumes  that Congress  must have  misspoken  in
expressing  its  policies.  For  him,  Congress  is  quite  coherent  in  policy
formulation  but quite  messy  in its expression.  Justice  Scalia,  in contrast,
believes  that  statutes  frequently  rest upon  undetectable  compromises.  He
accordingly  believes  that the only  legitimate way  to implement Congress's
handiwork  is to give effect to the details of the enacted text when that text is
clear  in  its  semantic  context.  For  him,  the legislative  process  should be
presumed to be quite messy in policy formulation, but quite deliberate in its
expression  of what  has  been  agreed  upon  by  the  majority  in  the  process
prescribed for legislation.
Because neither presumption ultimately has a meaningful empirical basis
for  finding  that  an  awkward  means/ends  reflects  either  compromise  or
inadvertence  in  any  given  case,  the best  one  can  do in  choosing  between
them  is  to  select  the  presumption  that  accords  more  fully  with  the
background  assumptions  that  emanate  from  the  constitutional  structure.
Two considerations  favor that textualist presumption of deliberately  drafted
but untidy compromise.  First, because  the lawmaking  structure prescribed
but omits it in another section of the same  Act, it is generally presumed  that Congress  acts
intentionally  and  purposely  in  the  disparate  inclusion  or  exclusion."'  Russello  v.  United
States, 464 U.S.  16,  23  (1983)  (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d  720,  722
(5th  Cir.  1972)).  Accordingly, in  contrast with  the falsely  making provision, the  semantic
meaning of the possession provision cannot be read to require proof that the counterfeit coin
is  in use as  currency.  Despite  the foregoing semantic  clarity, then-Judge  Breyer argued that
the  omission  of a  currency  element  from  the  possession  provision  constituted  a  drafting
error.  See  Breyer,  supra note  155,  at  851.  Prior  to  a  1965  reorganization  of  the
counterfeiting  statute, both the possession  and falsely making  offenses  had been part of the
same paragraph,  and both had been  subject to the  qualifier that the relevant offenses  apply
only to  coins used as  currency  in the  United  States.  See  id. at  850.  The court  of appeals
reasoned  that  when  Congress  broke  out  possession  as  a  separate  offense,  it  accidentally
dropped the qualifier.  See id.  Judge Breyer found that conclusion to be warranted based on
his reading of  the accompanying committee reports,  which in his view provided "fairly clear
answers"  to the interpretive question. Id.  at  851.  He thus explained as follows:
[The  reports] specify that the congressional  reenactment  of the law, reorganizing it
and rewriting  some of it,  was intended  to  serve purely  organizational  objectives.
They say  that Congress  expected,  after  the  changes,  that  the  law  would  remain
what it  was before  the  changes....  The  reports  thereby  indicate  that  no  one  in
Congress  intended  to  change  substantive  law  or to  rewrite  federal  counterfeiting
law so  that it helped protect the currency of all nations  ....
Id.  Even assuming that the legislative history spoke as decisively as Judge Breyer suggested,
it is not apparent why  a court should give precedence  to clear legislative history rather than
the clear import of the agreed-upon  statutory text.
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by Article I quite plainly evinces  the purpose to protect political  minorities
by  giving  them  extraordinary  power  to  insist  upon  compromise,  a
constitutionally  appropriate  theory of interpretation  should facilitate,  rather
than thwart, the ability of legislative  stakeholders to reduce their bargained-
for  compromises  to  effective  written  agreements.  By  converting  hard-
edged rules into open-ended  standards,  strong purposivism undermines that
capacity.  Second,  the  presumption  of coherence  that  underlies  Justice
Stevens's strong purposivism is in significant tension with the constitutional
premises  underlying  the  rational-basis  test,  which  presupposes  that
legislatures typically adopt rough-hewn compromises  and that courts in our
system  must  respect  those  outcomes  if  minimally  rational.  Otherwise,
judges risk substituting their own preferences for the unruly but democratic
preferences of the legislature.  In the past two decades,  the Court has begun
to  embrace  the  foregoing  premises  and  to  move  away  from  the  strong
purposivism  that prevailed  when Justice  Stevens  first  took his  seat  three
decades  ago.